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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the dramatic changes of the latter half of the twentieth century are those
in the field of health care.' Advances in medical technology allow people to live
longer, and often with a better quality of life.2 However, despite modem
technology, for some individuals, quality of life is a necessary sacrifice in the quest
to delay death. In 1983, as many as 5,000 patients subsisted in a vegetative state
in this country.4 Today, the estimated number of patients living in a permanent
unconscious state, perhaps by artificial means, has risen to 14,000.
5
Another change in health care is the shift in location of care from the home to
the hospital.6 Consequently, most people with a terminal illness now die in the
hospital rather than at home. However, these patients do have options; some issue
written directions to enable health care providers to perform in accordance with the
patients' wishes in the event the patients cannot provide such direction.8 Such
written direction, termed an "advance directive," may be in the form of an
individual health care instruction, a power of attorney for health care, or both.9
State legislatures have recognized the need for written direction by the patient
or a surrogate decision-maker in the event of incapacitation.'0 By the mid-1970s to
1. See, e.g., TIME MAGAZINE, GREAT EVENTS OF THE 20TH CENTURY 147-48 (1997) (emphasizing
scientific advancement in health-related areas ranging from heart transplantation to the cloning of animals).
2. See Aging: The Surest Demographic Reality of the Next Century, WORLD HEALTH, Mar.-Apr. 1998,
at 26-27 (describing improvements in sanitation, medical care, nutrition, and pollution control that help promote
healthier lives, as well as longer lives, and reporting that an average life expectancy at the beginning of the
twentieth century was no more than 50 years, whereas today, life expectancies average above 75 years).
3. See generally Joe Loconte, Hospice, Not Hemlock, 88 POL'Y REV. 40 (1998) (describing patients in
hospitals with terminal illnesses and subjected to painful and intrusive medical interventions in futile attempts to
prolong life).
4. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 176 n.15 (1983) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
5. A. R. Buchert, The Persistent Vegetative State (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.geocities.com/Hot
Springs/Oasis/2919> (copy of file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally ita (providing information
about persistent vegetative state (PVS) such as the medical definitions of death and PVS, information on the
prevalence of PVS, descriptions of ethical dilemmas, and a discussion of landmark cases involving PVS).
6. George P. Smith, All's Well that Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 366 (1989).
7. Id.
8. See Don Udall, Living Will Is a Way to Restore Dignity to Death, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 14,
1999, at G02 (calling for every American to implement written instructions regarding end-of-life care, and noting
that without these patient directives, doctors are bound to maintain life regardless of a patient's specific
circumstances).
9. CAL PROB. CODE § 4605 (enacted by Chapter 658).
10. See ABA Comm'n on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Trends in Health Decisions Legislation Relevant
to the PSDA (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.abaneLorg/elderly/psda.html> [hereinafter ABA Comm'n] (copy
on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing a list of legislation passed by various state legislatures in this
area).
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the mid-1980s, almost all states had enacted statutes for "living wills."' 1 In the late
1980s and early 1990s, legislation for the durable power of attorney for health care,
or proxy directive, appeared.12 The current trend is to rewrite these laws into
uniform and comprehensive statutes that cover advance directives, surrogate
consent, emergency medical services, and donation of anatomical gifts. 3
Chapter 658 follows this trend by combining the power of attorney for health
care, individual health care instructions, and anatomical gifts laws into the Health
Care Decisions Law.14 The new Health Care Decisions Law is intended to provide
uniform standards to govern health care for adults deprived of decision-making
capacity.' 5 Chapter 658 also provides an optional statutory form that addresses all
health care decisions in a single form.16 Because Chapter 658 involves a mechanism
by which a person may refuse medical treatment even when such action leads to
death, a discussion of the bill involves strong moral and ethical overtones.'
7
Part II of this Legislative Note will discuss the legal background of health care
decisions, including the doctrine of informed consent, existing federal and
California legislation, and select cases that exposed the need for further legislation.
The codification of Chapter 658 is described in Part I, and the impact of Chapter
658 on health care decision-making is examined in Part IV This Legislative Note
then concludes by asserting that Chapter 658 injects positive changes into
California's laws allowing for advanced directives by simplifying those laws, but
also concedes that although the new law does protect to some extent those patients
lacking advance directives, its effectiveness will be blunted until further legislation
11. See id. (noting that only three states, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York, do not have "living
will" statutes); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 945-46 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "living will" as a document
which states th-e declarant's intention to refuse medical treatment if the declarant becomes both terminally ill and
unable to communicate wishes).
12. ABA Comm'n, supra note 10; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "power
of attorney" as a written instrument whereby a principal appoints an agent to act on behalf of the principal); Id.
(defining "durable power of attorney" as a power of attorney that becomes and remains effective only when the
principal is incapacitated).
13. See, e.g., ABA Comm'n, supra note 10 (reporting that in 1991, New Jersey was the first state to adopt
a comprehensive health care decisions act, followed by Maryland and Connecticut in 1993, and noting that
Virginia, Florida, and Arizona merged the living will and the durable power of attorney for health care into a
single instrument in 1992).
14. CAL PROB. CODE § 4600 (enacted by Chapter 658).
15. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITIEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 891, at 2 (July 13, 1999).
16. CAL PROB. CODE § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
17. Cf., e.g., Choice in Dying, Background on the Right to Die (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.
choices.orglissues.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (voicing support for an individual's right
to choose to reject treatment, and expressing opposition to prolonged, futile treatment); International Anti.
Euthanasia Task Force, The Living Will: Just a Simple Declaration? (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http:l/www.
iaetf.org/lw.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (declaring a distrust of physicians based upon
an underlying fear that desired treatment will be withheld, and declaring opposition to allowing death when
medical treatment would prolong the patient's life).
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or case law clarifies the rules regarding who may make decisions on such a
patient's behalf. 8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As medical technology advances, Americans are concerned with the negative
aspects of life-sustaining technology. 9 Life-sustaining treatment could mean the
maintenance of biological functions even when an individual's recovery of
cognitive function is beyond hope.2' Sometimes, life-prolonging medical
procedures involve severe pain or discomfort, but do not significantly improve the
ill effects of an individual's disease.2' Individual rights to refuse medical treatment
evolved from the doctrine of informed consent,' and led state legislatures to enact
statutes providing for self-determination in health care.23 Numerous controversies
arising from the concept of self-determination in health care have evoked judicial
intervention in both federal and state decisions.24
A. Refusal of Medical Treatment and the Doctrine of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent provides the basis for the right to refuse
medical treatment.2 For the past two decades, Americans have petitioned the courts
18. Infra Part V.
19. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 4, at 141-42 (describing recent changes in the
administration of health care, including the more frequent occurrence of death under medical supervision and
developments in medical technology that have prompted growing concern among Americans about death and
dying); Ernle W.D. Young, Ethical Issues at the End of Life, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267,272 (1998) (noting
that Americans have become troubled that "technologically-driven medicine" makes natural death difficult or
impossible); Stephanie McKinnon McDade, A Dignified Death Requires Decisions and a Family Plan,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 26, 1998, at GI (questioning whether Americans want to continue life indefinitely, and
revealing that most people are interested in the quality of life, length of suffering, and the presence of family
members at the time of death).
20. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,654-55 (1976) (detailing the biological state of Karen Quinlan,
whose life was maintained with a respirator and nasogastric feeding without hope of restoration to cognitive or
sapient life); see infra note 121 and accompanying text (summarizing the facts of the Quinlan case).
21. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1976)
(involving a sixty-seven-year-old man, Saikewicz, who had a mental age of two years and eight months and had
lived in state institutions for fifty-three years); id. (noting that Saikewicz was not able to communicate verbally,
and that he resorted to gestures and grunts to make his wishes known to others, and responded only to gestures
or physical contacts); i. (stating that Saikewicz was diagnosed with an invariably fatal form of leukemia, and
finding that the only treatment, chemotherapy, would have been poorly tolerated by a person of Saikewicz's
mental age, in light of the associated profound weakness and nausea that chemotherapy causes).
22. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,242,502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,513 (1972).
23. See Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857,860-
62 (1992) (noting that "living will" statutes were enacted in over forty states following public debate concerning
dramatic court cases involving rights to refuse medical treatment); see, e.g., infra Part lI.B (discussing federal and
California statutes involving health care decisions).
24. See infra Part ll.C (reviewing several California cases and a recent Supreme Court case).
25. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242,502 P.2d at 9,104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
2000/Health and Welfare
for the right of self-determination in health care decisions.26 The central issue in
these petitions has been the right to refuse medical treatment, even if the
consequence of refusal would be death.27
In Cobbs v. Grant,2 the California Supreme Court affirmed that an adult of
sound mind has the right to control his or her own body and the right to refuse or
consent to medical treatment.29 The right to refuse medical treatment is a corollary
to the right of consent, based on the reasoning that the right to consent without the
right to refuse would be a hollow right indeed.3' The Cobbs court found that lawful
medical treatment requires "informed consent. 31 Informed consent is a person's
choice to allow treatment after a physician has disclosed the information that the
person needs in order to evaluate the risks and benefits involved in the proposed
32treatment. The court found that only when the patient is unable to weigh the risk
of a medical treatment, such as when an emergency has arisen or the patient is a
child or incompetent adult, is the denial of the patient's right to be informed
permissible.33 In all other circumstances, the decision whether to consent or refuse
medical treatment "is vested in the party most directly affected: the patient."
34
The ethical and moral aspects of the right to refuse treatment are evident in
cases wherein refusal of treatment is likely to lead to death.35 The public continues
to debate such controversial issues as the right to die, euthanasia, and assisted
suicide.S6 The issue of whether a right to refuse medical treatment extends to those
26. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (1986)
(petitioning for the right to withdraw medical treatment); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 189,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220,221 (1984) (same).
27. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137,225 Cal. Rptr. at 300; Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 220-21.
28. 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
29. Id. at 242,502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
30. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,489 (1983); see Thor v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 725,735,855 P.2d 375,381,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357,363 (1993) (confirming that a right
to refuse medical treatment evolved at common law as a corollary to the Cobbs decision).
31. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242,502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
32. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (noting that for consent to be
*informed," the patient must be made aware of all information that is material to the decision contemplated).
33. Id. at 243,502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
34. Id. at 244,502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (emphasis added).
35. See Kadish, supra note 23, at 857 (noting that today's medical practice involving the discontinuance
of life-sustaining treatment challenges society's most deeply held moral beliefs). See generally Smith, supra note
6, at 281-82 (discussing issues arising from self-determination and noting that refusing life-sustaining treatment
has been called a '"form of suicide").
36. Such controversies challenge the very meaning of these terms. "Euthanasia" is defined as the act of
painlessly putting to death, as an act of mercy, persons who are suffering. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 575 (7th
ed. 1999). But see Edward A. Lyon, The Right to Die: An Exercise of informed Consent, Not an Extension of the
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U. CIN.L. RIEV. 1367, 1368 (1990) (noting that ethicists distinguish (1) "active
euthanasia--the active administration of a death-producing agent to accelerate death"--or assisted suicide, from
(2) "passive euthanasia"---the act of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment-and (1)
"voluntary" forms of euthanasia from (2) "involuntary" forms of euthanasia, thus asserting that "the term 'right
to die' generally refers to passive voluntary euthanasia"). Daily newspapers note the ongoing debate surrounding
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
who are incapacitated further complicates these controversies. 37 Opinions regarding
end-of-life decisions have two opposing extremes-the pro-sustenance-of-life view
and the pro-choice-in-dying view.38 The pro-sustenance-of-life group suspects that
the advance directive that instructs the withholding of life-sustaining treatment is
a preliminary mechanism that can lead to the legalization of assisted suicide.39 On
the other side, the pro-choice-in-dying group advocates for the right to die,
including the choice of assisted suicide in hopeless situations.4°
B. Statutes Involving Self-Determination in Health Care
1. Federal Legislation and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Uniform
Health Care Decisions Act
Both a federal statute, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA),4 and a
uniform model act, the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA), 42 influenced
the enactment of Chapter 658. 4 In 1990, as part of the federal Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act," the United States Congress enacted the PSDA. The PSDA
conditions Medicare funding to health care facilities upon facility compliance with
programs focused on providing each patient with information about advance
directives.45 In addition to the requirement that all patients be provided with written
instruction regarding advance directives, the PSDA mandates that any advance
directive executed by a patient becomes part of the patient's record.
46
The UHCDA, a national model act approved by the Uniform Law
Commissioners in 1993, attempts to overcome the fragmented, incomplete, and
these issues. See, e.g., Chris Clarke, Let the Public Speak. My Choice, PRESs DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), May
10, 1999, at B4 (emphasizing personal choice in the right-to-die issue); William M. Kaula, Assisted Suicide, L.A.
TIMES, May 31, 1999, at B4 (presenting two letters with opposing views: a pro-choice-in-dying view and a pro-
sustenance-of-life view that expresses fear that involuntary euthanasia will be extended to the mentally disturbed,
mentally retarded, and the elderly); Mary Knight, M.D., Assisted Suicide Bill, L.A. TiMES, June 4, 1999, at B6
(expressing fear that promoting assisted suicide will lead to involuntary euthanasia, converting the right to die into
the duty to die, in a fashion similar to the situation in Nazi Germany, where the sick and mentally retarded were
put to death for the "good" of Germany).





41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
42. UNIFORM HEALTH CAE DECISIONS Acr §§ 1-19 (1993).
43. Health Care Decisions forAdults Without Decision-Making Capacity, 29 CAL. L. REVISION COMMN
REPORTS 1, 11 (1999) [hereinafter REVISION COMM'NI.
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
46. IdL
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often inconsistent health care decisions legislation of the states by providing a
model act that covers all forms of advance directives in a single measure.47 The
UHCDA includes important provisions for the incapacitated individual who does
not have an advance directive; such provisions include: (1) a hierarchy of
permissible surrogate decision-makers, which would involve friends in the absence
of family;4 and (2) standards for surrogate decision-making which are based on the
incapacitated individual's best interest.
49
2. California Statutes Involving Health Care Decision-Making
California law involving self-determination in health care decisions prior to
Chapter 658 was established mainly by two statutes: the Natural Death Act50 and
the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care.5'
a. The Natural Death Act
In 1976, in an effort to decrease the burden on the California court system in
determining end-of-life health care decisions,52 California became the first state to
enact a "living will" statute,53 known as the Natural Death Act.m A "living will" is
a set of written instructions regarding the rendering of end-of-life health care in the
event of the declarant's incapacitation.55 The Act proved to be limited and
cumbersome because it required: (1) concurring diagnoses by two physicians; 56 (2)
time restraints on both the execution and the term of the directive;57 and (3)
witnessing by two individuals who are unrelated to the declarant and who would not
profit from the declarant's death.58 In 1991, the California Natural Death Act was
47. See UmF.HEALTHCAREDEcISIONSAcr §§ 1-19 (1993) (providing a model code that comprehensively
addresses health care decisions).
48. Id§ 5(f).
49. Id.; see also infra Part Il (explaining that under Chapter 658, the only surrogate who has decision-
making capacity is the surrogate who has been specifically designated by written or oral advance directive, and
pointing out that Chapter 658 makes no provision beyond setting "best interest" standards for surrogate decision-
making for an incapacitated or unconscious individual who has not executed an advance directive).
50. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1439, sec. 1-3, at 6478-83 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195).
51. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 1204, sec. 10, at 4615 (enacting CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 2430-2443).
52. See Kathleen M. Malone, The Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment in California: Who Should
Decide and by What Standards, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1021, 1021-23 (1992) (observing that California was
the first stzte to enact statutes to allow the withholding of medical treatment in situations involving a terminal
condition, and noting that without such legislation, the "over-burdened California court system" had been forced
to determine these issues).
53. PRESIDET's COM'WN, supra note 4, at 141.
54. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1439, sec. 1-3, at 6478-83 (enacting CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195).
55. Smith, supra note 6, at 328-29.
56. 1976 Cal. StaL clh. 1439, sec. 1, at 6479-81 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188).
57. Id. at 6479, 6481 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7188,7189.5).
53. lUL at 6479 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188).
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revised by: (1) adding "permanent unconsciousness" to the list of triggers for
actuating advance directives, which had previously only included "terminal
illness";59 (2) adding "artificially administered nutrition and hydration" to the types
of treatment that could be withdrawn; 6° (3) prohibiting the honoring of a "living
will" if the qualified declarant was known to be pregnant; 61 and (4) deleting any
time limitation on the validity of an advance directive.62
b. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
The durable power of attorney for health care, another predecessor statute to
Chapter 658, was originally enacted in California in 1983,63 and was revised in
199 1.6 The durable power of attorney for health care is a written document that
allows the declarant to appoint another person to make health care decisions on the
declarant's behalf in the event of her loss of decision-making capability.'
Originally, the durable power of attorney for health care was effective only for
seven years,6 but that time limit was eliminated in 1991.67 Unless expressly valid
for a specific duration, a durable power of attorney for health care is now
considered to be binding indefinitely.(
c. California Regulation
Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations governs health care facilities,
and therefore has a significant impact on health care providers and patients. This
title also provides a list of patients' rights.70 Among patients' rights is the right to
"participate actively in decisions regarding medical care [;]. . .[t]o the extent
permitted by law, this includes the right to refuse treatment. 7
59. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 895, sec. 3, at 3979-81 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186).
60. Ilt, sec. 2, at 3974 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5 (a), (c)-(d), (f)).
61. Id. at 3975-77 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186.5(b), 7189.5(c)).
62. Id. at 3976-77 (enacting CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187.5) (repealing CAL HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7189.5).
63. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 1204, sec. 10, at 4615-22 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2430-2443).
64. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 896, sec. 1-5, at 3980-91 (amending CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2433-2503.5).
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1191 (7th ed. 1999).
66. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 1204, sec. 10 at 4620 (enacting CAL CIV. CODE § 2436.5).
67. 1991 Cal. Stat. Ch. 896, sec.2-3, at 3982-83 (amending CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2436.5,2444).
68. CAL PROB. CODE § 4686 (enacted by Chapter 658).
69. CAL CODE REOs. tit. 22, § 70707 (1975).
70. Id.
71. Id. at § 70707(b)(6).
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C. Court Cases Involving the Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment
Notwithstanding the statutory and common law support for recognition of a
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, when such a refusal is likely to lead
to death, the courts often must determine the permissibility of such refusal.72 In
determining an individual's right to refuse medical treatment, the courts weigh the
individual's right of self-determination, or fundamental right to refuse treatment,
against four state interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of suicide;
(3) the maintenance of the integrity of the medical profession; and (4) the protection
of innocent third parties.73 Although instances do exist wherein courts have found
that the state interests of protecting innocent third parties74 and preventing suicide75
have priority over an individual's right of autonomy, in most circumstances the
courts find that the individual right of self-determination outweighs the state
interests.76
Cases involving a competent adult's refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment
are important to a discussion of Chapter 658 because these cases led to the statutory
recognition of "the fundamental right" to control the decision relating to one's own
health care, "including the decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or
withdrawn."' Moreover, cases involving incapacitated adults-some with and
some without advance directives-are important to the discussion of Chapter 658
because these cases have contributed to the development of "best interest" standards
72. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 725, 725, 855 P2d 375, 375, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 357
(1993) (petitioning the court to direct the insertion of a feeding tube needed to prevent death); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1127,225 Cal. Rptr. 297,297 (1986) (petitioning the court to direct the removal
of a feeding tube despite the fact that such removal would result in the patient's death); Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. AIp. 3d 186, 189,209 Cal. Rptr. 220,221 (1984) (petitioning the court to direct the removal of ventilator
equipment in accordance with the patient's wishes, even though such removal would likely hasten death).
73. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,271-72 (1990); Thor, 5 Cal. 4th at 738, 855 P.2d
at 383,21 Cal. Rptr. at 265; Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142,225 Cal. Rptr. at 304; Barling, 163 Cal. App. 3d
at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
74. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding the validity of a state statute
requiring an adult in perfect health and fit for vaccination to be vaccinated for smallpox for the protection of the
public health and the public safety); In re President & Dir. of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C.Cir.
1964) (authorizing a hospital to administer blood transfusions to an unwilling mother to save her life because the
State's policy would not allow a parent to leave a child motherless).
75. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 795 (1997) (declaring that New York's prohibition on assisted
suicide is constitutional, and stating that "[e]veryone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent,
to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide"); Donaldson v. Lungren,
2 Cal. App. 4th 1614, 1622, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (1992) (distinguishing between taking one's own life and
allowing a third person to assist in the suicide, and holding that a patient has no constitutional right to an assisted
suicide).
76. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
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for designated surrogate decision-making in the absence of specific instruction. 8
A discussion of these cases follows.
1. Cases Involving Competent Patients
Lower California courts, with some variation in reasoning, have upheld the
right of competent adults to refuse and withdraw treatment-even when the
consequences of such action is death.79
a. Bartling v. Superior Court
In Bartling v. Superior Court,80 the appellate court found that none of the four
state interests prevailed against the right to refuse medical treatment 8' The court
stated that "competent adult patients, with serious illnesses which are probably
incurable but have not been diagnosed as terminal, ha[ve] the right, over the
objection of [their] physicians and the hospital, to have life-support equipment
disconnected despite the fact that withdrawal of such devices will surely hasten
death. 82 In that case, Mr. Bartling, who suffered from multiple chronic and
debilitating conditions, had encountered complications which ultimately made him83
dependent on a ventilator. Although Mr. Bartling had signed a properly witnessed
"living will"84 and a durable power of attorney for health care,85 and further had
expressed his wish to be withdrawn from the ventilator by written declaration, the
78. See REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 25-26 (asserting that California statutory law, prior to the
enactment of Chapter 658, did not provide guidelines for surrogate decision-making, but that such decisions were
guided by case law which involved the determination of the patient's's"est interest"); see, e.g., Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,493 (1983) (declaring that the patient's best interest
ought to provide the guidelines to the surrogate decision-maker); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,428 (Mass. 1976) (observing that the "best interests" of an incompetent may not be
served by mandating treatment which may briefly prolong life but which also may substantially increase
suffering). See generally Kadish, supra note 23, at 881-87 (noting that the best interests standard was developed
by English courts to govern expenditures from the estates of incompetent individuals, and that the same standard
is used by American courts to determine whether or not to withdraw or withhold medical treatment from
terminally ill patients; however, reporting that some courts have questioned whether a standard created for
property should also apply to the provision of health care).
79. E.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186,209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
80. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186,209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); see supra note 73 and accompanying text (listing
four state interests that are balanced against the patient's rights to self-determination in shaping the scope of the
right to refuse medical treatment).
81. Barnling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189,209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
82. lId at 186,209 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
83. I at 189-90, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
84. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing "living wills").
85. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (describing the durable power of attorney for health
care).
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doctors and the hospital had refused to comply with Mr. Bartling's wishes.8 6 The
doctors and the hospital expressed moral and ethical opposition to his request, in
addition to concern about potential civil and criminal liability for complying with
Mr. Bartling's wishes.Y7
Considering the concept of "irrational self-destruction" in balancing the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment against the State's interest in preventing suicide,
the court found Mr. Bartling's decision to deprive himself of the aid of the
ventilator to be both competent and rational under his debilitating circumstances. 88
The cotut declared Mr. Bartling's right of self-determination in medical treatment
under these conditions to be paramount, outweighing the interests of the doctors and
hospital.'39
b. Bouvia v. Superior Court
Using different reasoning, the appellate court in Bouvia v. Superior Court
upheld the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as a "moral and philosophical
decision" to be made by the individual.91 Indeed, the court went so far as to find the
motives for the decision to be inconsequential. 92 In Bouvia, Ms. Bouvia, born with
cerebral palsy which had progressed to quadriplegia, had asked the court to compel
the hospital to remove a nasogastric tube that had been force-feeding her.93
Suffering from degenerative arthritis, Ms. Bouvia was bedridden and experienced
constant pain for which she received an automatic, intermittent infusion of
morphine.94 Having no means of financial support, Ms. Bouvia lived on an
alternating basis with different friends, and subsequently lived in public facilities. 95
As her condition continued to deteriorate, she experienced difficulty in swallowing
without vomiting, and a feeding tube was placed in her stomach against her will.96
The court directed the hospital to remove the nasogastric tube and prohibited
the replacement of any similar device without Ms. Bouvia's consent.97 The Bouvia
court's decision reinforces the Bartling decision with one exception: the court did
not use Bartling's rationality test to examine the motive behind the decision to
86. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 190-92,209 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
87. Id. at 192,209 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
88. See id. at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (suggesting that refusing life-sustaining treatment is "irrational
self-destruction" when death is not inevitable and the possibility of a cure or preservation of life still exists).
89. Id., at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
90. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
91. 1& at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
92. ML at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
93. AL at 1135-37, 225 Cal Rptr. at 305.
94. Id. at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
95. Id., 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
96. Id., 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
97. Id. at 1146,225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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refuse treatment. 98 Instead, the Bouvia court stressed that the decision to refuse life-
sustaining treatment was a "moral and philosophical decision" belonging to
Ms. Bouvia alone, regardless of her motives in so deciding.99
c. Thor v. Superior Court
In Thor v. Superior Court,1' ° the California Supreme Court held that "a
competent, informed adult has a fundamental right of self-determination to refuse
or demand the withdrawal of medical treatment of any form," regardless of the
consequences.1 ' In this case, a prison inmate who had an accident in prison
resulting in quadriplegia had refused food, treatment, and medication.'02 Although
he was found competent by a psychiatrist, the prison physician, Daniel Thor, sought
an order to allow him to insert a feeding tube without the prisoner's consent. 0 3 The
court removed the facts from the prison context after determining that the right to
refuse medical treatment was not a right that posed a threat to the security of the
prison.'°4
Using a proportionality test to weigh the benefits of treatment against the
burden of treatment, the court concluded that feeding the prisoner would prolong
his life, but would offer no hope of reversing his severely disabled and dependent
state.05 The court based its decision on the doctrine of informed consent and
supporting California statutes,'06 and further noted that the very meaning of self-
determination depends on its freedom from the "scrutiny of anyone else's" moral
or ethical views. 07
98. Malone, supra note 52, at 1038; see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196,209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984) (finding that the right to refuse treatment outweighs the state's interest in the
preservation of life when the decision is rational under the circumstances). But cf Bouvia v Superior Court, 179
Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986) (finding the motivation of an individual's decision to
refuse treatment to be irrelevant).
99. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1143,225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
100. 5 Cal. 4th 725,732, 855 P.2d 375,378,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357,360 (1993).
101. lia at 732, 855 P.2d at 378, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
102. Id., 855 P.2d at 378, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
103. Id. at 732-33, 855 P.2d at 379,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
104. Id. at 734, 855 P.2d at 380,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
105. IL at 740,855 P.2d at 384,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
106. See idl at 736, 855 P.2d 375, 381. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 363 (declaring that under California
administrative regulations patients have a right to refuse medical treatment); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 70707(6) (1975) (allowing for a patient's right to "participate actively" in her own medical decisions); supra
notes 50-68 and accompanying text (summarizing California statutes supporting self-determination).
107. Thor, 5 Cal. 4th at 741,855 P.2d at 385, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
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2. Cases Involving Incapacitated Patients
a. The United States Supreme Court's Deference to the States
In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,"'8 the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged'that its prior decisions may have implied that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.1t 9 However, when faced squarely with the issue of whether a person in
a persistent vegetative state has a constitutional right to refuse, through a surrogate,
life-sustaining treatment, the Court referred the issue to the individual states and
their respective constitutions and statutes.!10
In Cruzan, the parents of a thirty-two-year-old victim of an automobile accident
appealed to the Court to reverse a Missouri Supreme Court decision that prohibited
the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition from their daughter."' The
patient, Nancy Cruzan, was maintained in a persistent vegetative state, with
virtually no chance of recovery, for nearly nine years before her parents petitioned
a court to allow the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration mechanisms so
that she could die naturally."2 Ms. Cruzan did not have a written advance directive
and had not granted a durable power of attorney for health care to any person prior
to her accident." 
3
Under Missouri's statutory law, only a competent person may explicitly refuse
in writing the administration of "death-prolonging procedures."'"14 Furthermore,
nutrition and hydration are not considered "death-prolonging procedures" in
Missouri." 5 The Missouri Court in Cruzan recognized the right to refuse treatment
based on the doctrine of informed consent, but denied applicability of the doctrine
108. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
109. Id. at 278.
110. Id. at 280.
111. Id. at 261.
112. Id See generally Carl Hernandez 1H, Legitimate Exercise of Parens Patriae Doctrine: State Power to
Detrinine an Incompetent Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan Ex Rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 6 BYU J. PuB. L. 167, 169 (1992) (analyzing the Cruzan case based on constitutional,
statutory, and common law grounds and advocating the exercise of the parens patriae doctrine). Black's Law
Dictionary defines "parens patriae" literally as "parent of the country," and notes that the term "refers traditionally
to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability .... ." BLACK'S LAW
DiCTIONA:Y 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
113. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,420 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1988).
114. Mo. REv. STAT. §459.015 (1992); see id. 459.010(3) (1992) (defining "[d]eath-prolonging procedure"
as:
any medical procedure or intervention which, when applied to a patient, would serve only to prolong
artificially the dying process and where, in the judgment of the attending physician pursuant to usual
and customary medical standards, death will occur within a short time whether or not such procedure
or intzrvention is utilized).
115. Id. § 459.010(3).
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in this case due to Ms. Cruzan's inability to be informed.116 The state supreme court
decided that the Missouri policy so strongly favors the state interest of the
preservation of life that any order to terminate medical treatment that is likely to
result in death requires either the formalities of a living will, or clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
u7
The United States Supreme Court upheld Missouri's right to require clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes before terminating life-sustaining
treatment1ls Hence, absent any further guidance from the Court, the individual
states are left to develop the means necessary to determine and safeguard the health
care decisions of individuals." 9
b. California Cases Involving Incapacitated Patients
Unlike Missouri, California court decisions involving the right to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from one who lacks capacity'2 follow New Jersey's landmark
case, In re Quinlan.'21 California decisions regarding the withdrawal of medical
treatment from incompetent patients are based on the premise that incapacitated
individuals have a right to die by natural forces-in other words, they have the right
to refuse medical treatment-if a surrogate determines that such refusal or
withdrawal is in the patient's best interests.2' Often, exercising that right involves
adherence to an advance directive or, in the absence of an advance directive,
reliance on the "best judgment" of the guardian and family of an incapacitated
individual.'2
In Barber v. Superior Court, 24 a criminal case, two physicians were charged
with murder after they removed the ventilator and other life-sustaining equipment
from Mr. Herbert, who was in a vegetative state. Although Mr. Herbert had no
116. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S..2d 408,416-17 (1988).
117. Id. at 419.
118. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990).
119. lit at 280-81.
120. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 205, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (1988);
Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308-09, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532-33 (1988); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019-20, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,491-92 (1983).
121. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (1975) (holding that the guardian and family of Karen Ann
Quinlan, a twenty-two-year-old woman who was alive because of artificial ventilation and otheradvanced medical
technology, could direct the withdrawal of the life-support apparatus without civil or criminal liability if the
responsible physicians were to conclude that "no reasonable possibility" existed that Ms. Quinlan would ever
return to a cognitive state).
122. See Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 205, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (explaining that California law gives a
person the right to determine her own medical treatment and that such right survives incompetence through
surrogate decision-making); Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 308-09,253 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33 (1988) (finding that
a conservator can refuse medical treatment on behalf of a conservatee in a persistent vegetative state based on the
incompetent patient's right to have decisions made on his or her behalf).
123. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
124. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (1983).
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written directive regarding his end-of-life wishes, in prior years he had told his wife
that he would not want "to become another Karen Ann Quinlan," referring to the
young New Jersey woman whose life had been prolonged by artificial ventilation
equipment.'25 The family in Mr. Herbert's case had provided a written request to the
hospital asking that all life-sustaining equipment be removed.'26 After his removal
from the ventilator, Mr. Herbert continued to breathe, but showed no signs of
recovet.' 27 Two days later, the intravenous tubes were removed, and Mr. Herbert
was kept comfortable until his death one week later.2 '
Using the proportionality test, which weighs the benefit of treatment against the
burden of treatment, the appellate court found that the life-sustaining treatment
provided to Mr. Herbert only maintained his biological functioning without
providing any cure for his vegetative state; treatment merely maintained his
vegetative state.129 The court also required that decisions be guided by the patient's
"best interests."' 30 The court proposed three factors to be considered in determining
a patient's "best interests": (1) the ability of medical treatment to relieve suffering;
(2) the ability of medical treatment to preserve or restore functioning; and (3) the
quality and extent of life sustained.' 3' Applying these factors to Mr. Herbert's
circumstances, the court held that the cessation of continued treatment was not
unlawful even though the physicians knew that without such treatment, Mr. Herbert
would die.'32
In a similar case, another California court considered whether a conservator
could direct the withdrawal of life support from a patient who was in a vegetative
state with no hope of recovery.3 3 Although the court characterized the unconscious
person's right to choose as "a legal fiction,"'1' it also noted that an unconscious
125. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493; see In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651 (presenting the facts surrounding
Ms. Quinlan's situation).
126. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
127. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493; see id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (noting that Karen Ann Quinlan also continued
to breathe, but her father never sought to have the feeding tube removed); Smith, supra note 6, at 368-69
(observing that Ms.Quinlan lived for ten years after her hallmark case was decided).
128. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
129. d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
130. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The "best interests" criteria is incorporated into Chapter 658. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658); see infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (providing standards
for surrogate decision-making).
131. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
132. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr at 493.
133. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 189-90, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841-42 (1988)
(involving a conservator who petitioned the court for the withdrawal of life support from his brother, who had
suffered a severe head injury in an automobile accident and had remained in a comatose state with a feeding tube
for five yeazs); id at 191, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (agreeing that the conservatee's "best interests" dictated that the
feeding tub be removed, so finding because of the conservatee's prior express conversations with his live-in
girlfriend regarding his desire not to live in a vegetative state).
134. Id at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854; see id. 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (pointing out that Mr. Drabick could not
"choose" anything in his state of unconsciousness).
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person should not have his or her life prolonged just because medical technology
makes such prolongation possible.1 35 The incompetent person still has the right to
have a decision made in accordance with his or her own interests and values.
36
Unlike the Missouri court in Cruzan,137 the California court considered the patient's
prior informal statements regarding end-of-life treatment, along with medical
advice as it applied to the patient's best interests, to be important factors in
determining whether medical treatment could be stopped. 138
m. CHAPTER 658: CODIFYING STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW SUPPORT
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN HEALTH CARE
Because existing statutes do not provide standards for surrogate decision-
making for those who lack the capacity to make end-of-life decisions, California
courts have been burdened with determining on a case-by-case basis who may make
such end-of-life decisions, and with providing guidelines for those making such
decisions.139 Chapter 658 was introduced to provide consistency for health care
providers and the families of those lacking decision-making capacity." ° Prior to
Chapter 658's passage, courts had to direct the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment on a case-by-case basis, even when judicial
intervention was "unnecessary," as in the cases wherein the decision to withhold
treatment is authorized.141 Chapter 658 imposes fines on health care providers who
do not comply with the patient's wishes, doing so to motivate health care providers
to follow the advance directives provided by their patients, and to minimize judicial
intervention.
42
135. Id., 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
136. Id., 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
137. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (1988), afrd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (declaring that prior
"statements attributable to Nancy" Cruzan regarding her own existence in the event of incapacitation are
"unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent" and therefore are not clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent's wishes as required by Missouri law); supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (providing more
details regarding the Cruzan case).
138. Drabick, at 210,245 Cal. Rptr. at 856. But see Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,284-
86 (1990) (upholding Missouri's requirement of clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes and
refusal to accept substituted judgment of close family members without substantial proof).
139. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMMEE ANALYSIS OF AB 891, at 2 (July 13, 1999).
140. Id. at 3, 8.
141. See, e.g., Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 216-18, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61 (1988) (stating that judicial
approval is not required for a conservator to direct the withholding of further treatment unless the decision is
challenged by another interested party or the decision had not been made in the "best interests" of the patient).
142. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMIITEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS oFAB 891, at 3, 8 (July 14, 1999); see infra
notes 262-66 and accompanying text (describing the mechanisms of Chapter 658 that so motivate health care
practitioners and avoid unnecessary judicial intervention).
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Chapter 658, California's new Health Care Decisions Law, governs health care
decisions made on behalf of incapacitated individuals. 43 Chapter 658 provides
mechanisms for a competent individual to self-direct health care at some future
time in the event of incapacitation.' 44 The new law repeals the Natural Death Act
and the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 45 but renews the provisions
inherent in both of those mechanisms under one comprehensive law.146 The new
Health Care Decisions Law is located within the Probate Code because of the
Probate Code's associated conservatorship statutes, court-authorized medical
treatment provisions, and powers of attorney. 147 Chapter 658 updates California law
to include use of the term "advance directive," a term which health care providers
use and which can mean either the instructions for future health care or the power
of attorney for health care.'"
Furthermore, Chapter 658 provides standards to govern decision-making in the
absence of an advance directive.149 Under the new law, health care decision-making
for incapacitated adults can be achieved by one or more of five methods: (1) the
power of attorney for health care; (2) oral or written individual health care
instructions (the written form previously was called the "living will"); (3) surrogate
decision-making; (4) court-appointed conservatorship; and (5) judicial
determination of health care.15°
The remainder of this Part will address the important provisions of Chapter 658,
including provisions affecting the aforementioned five methods of decision-making
for incapacitated adults, the duties and liabilities of health care providers, and
miscellaneous technical and procedural provisions.
A. The Power of Attorney for Health Care
Chapter 658 leaves largely unchanged most of the previous rules governing the
power of attorney.'' Although the new law uses the phrase "power of attorney for
health care" rather than the phrase "durable power of attorney for health care" used
143. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2355(a), 3208(c)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 658); id. § 4714 (enacted by
Chapter 658).
144. See REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 12 (describing the scope of Chapter 658).
145. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 658, sec. 1, at 3879 (repealing CAL. HEALTH & SAFFTY CODE §§ 7185-
7194.5 and CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4621,4651, 4653-4654,4700-4704,4720-4727).
146. Id. (re-enacting CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4701).
147. See REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 50-51 (discussing possible locations for a statute that
involves both incapacity planning and standards for health care decisions for incapacitated patients, and observing
that the Probate Code would be a prime candidate for such a location).
148. Id. at 18-19.
149. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658).
150. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 14-17.
151. Id. at 15.
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 31
in earlier statutes, the "durability" feature is clear in the new law."5 2 Under Chapter
658, the power of attorney for health care is a type of advance directive.'53 A power
of attorney for health care still requires a date of execution and two witnesses or the
notarization of the principal's signature." Chapter 658 replaces the previously
complicated rules governing the printed form of the Durable Powers of Attorney for
Health Care and similar instruments with the more easily understood introductory
explanations."'
The principal of the power of attorney for health care decides the amount or
limitation of authority to be given to the designated agent. 5 6 An agent who is
known to the health care provider to be available and willing to make decisions has
priority over any other person in making decisions. 5 7 According to the measure's
sponsor, because human circumstances are unpredictable and difficult to anticipate,
the power of attorney for health care continues to be the best method for an
individual to ensure self-determination at a time of incapacitation.55 Decisions
made by an individual who knows the incapacitated person well are more likely to
reflect the incapacitated person's wishes when unpredictable circumstances arise
than are those decisions committed to writing at a time when future circumstances
are unknown. 159
Under Chapter 658, a person with capacity can revoke the designated agent of
the power of attorney for health care by express writing or by notifying the health
care provider orally or in writing.' 6' In addition, Chapter 658 provides that a later
advance directive revokes a prior directive only to the extent of any conflicts
between the two directives.' 6' Chapter 658 retains the provision for the revocation
of a former spouse as agent following the dissolution or annulment of marriage. 62
It also continues the prohibition on health care providers or employees of care
152. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4686 (enacted by Chapter 658); see id. (providing that "[u]nless the power of
attorney for health care provides a time of termination, the authority of the agent is exercisable notwithstanding
any lapse of time since execution of the power of attorney"); see also REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 18
n.18 (recognizing that the word "durable" was used to define a power of attorney for health care when the concept
that a written instrument would become valid only in event of incapacitation was still novel).
153. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4605 (enacted by Chapter 658); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 891, at 1 (May 24, 1999) (stating that oral or written individual health care instructions, as well as the
power of attorney for health care, are types of advance directives).
154. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4673,4680 (enacted by Chapter 658).
155. See id. § 4701 (providing an optional "Advance Health Care Directive" form which includes a "Power
of Attorney for Health Care" section preceded by an "Explanation" section).
156. Id. §§ 4670-4672 (enacted by Chapter 658).
157. Id. § 4685 (enacted by Chapter 658).
158. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 18.
159. Id. at 30-31.
160. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4695(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
161. Id. § 4698 (enacted by Chapter 658).
162. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 307, see. 16, at 41-42 (enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 4727) (stating that
the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes the designation of a former spouse as agent for a durable power
of attorney for health care), with CAL. PROB. CODE § 4697 (enacted by Chapter 658) (perpetuating this provision).
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facilities to act as agents under the power of attorney for health care unless the
patient and employee are relatives or co-workers. t63 Powers of attorney for health
care that were executed before July 1, 2000, will remain valid.'
6
B. Individual Health Care Instructions
Chapter 658 empowers an adult having capacity' 65 to make his or her own
health care decisions.'6 Health care decisions can include: the selection and
discharge of health care providers and institutions; consent or refusal of diagnostic
tests, surgical procedures, and medication programs; and the withholding or
withdrawing of all forms of health care.' 67 If an adult having capacity chooses to
designate an agent to make health care decisions on his or her behalf, he or she may
specify the conditions that will need to occur to trigger the agent's ability to act on
the principal's behalf.1ea
Chapter 658 continues the existing limits on the authority of agents' 69 and the
prohibition of mercy killing, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.1 70 Health care that is
contrary to generally accepted health care standards is neither required nor
authorized. 171 The witnessing and dating requirements that apply to the power of
attorney for health care are also required for health care instructions, and the same
witness restrictions and requirements apply.
172
Chapter 658 simplifies the execution of both types of advance
directives-powers of attorney for health care and individual health care
instructions-because both are contained in the single optional statutory form.
73
163. Compare 1995 Cal. StaL ch. 417, sec. 3, at 3-4 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE § 4702) (prohibiting
health care providers who are treating the patient, or their employees, from acting as agents under a power of
attorney for health care unless related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, or employed by the same
employer as the principal), with CAL. PROD. CODE § 4659(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 658) (continuing this
provision without substantive change).
164. CAL PROB. CODE § 4665(d) (enacted by Chapter 658).
165. See Id. § 4609 (enacted by Chapter 658) (defining "capacity" as the ability to make and communicate
a health care decision based on an understanding of the nature and consequences of proposed health care,
including the risks and benefits of the treatment).
166. Id. § 4670 (enacted by Chapter 658).
167. Id. § 4617(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 658).
168. Il § 4670.
169. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 307, sec. 16, at 41 (enacting CAL PROD. CODE § 4722) (prohibiting
consent en behalf of a patient for: placement in a mental health facility, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery,
sterilization, or abortion), with CAL. PROB. CODE § 4652 (enacted by Chapter 658) (perpetuating these limits).
170. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 307, sec. 16, at 41 (enacting CAL PROB. CODE § 4723) (insisting that
"[niothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing"), with CAL. PROD.
CODE § 4653 (enacted by Chapter 658) (continuing this disclaimer but expanding it to include "assisted suicide"
and "euthanasia").
171. CAL PROD. CODE § 4654 (enacted by Chapter 658).
172. Id. §§ 4673, 4680 (enacted by Chapter 658).
173. Id. § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
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Valid "living wills" or other advance directives executed before July 1, 2000,
remain valid under Chapter 658.174
C. Surrogate Decision-Making
Chapter 658 unifies the standards governing the decision-making of the patient-
designated surrogate, the court appointed conservator, and the courts themselves. 75
Chapter 658 specifically requires that all surrogate decision-makers act consistently
with the express wishes of the principal if such wishes are known, and if they are
not known, then the measure requires surrogates to act in the "best interest" of the
principal, considering the principal's personal values.176 Chapter 658 extends this
standard to an agent named in the patient's advance directive,177 a family member
or friend acting as a surrogate decision-maker, 78 a public guardian, 17 9 or a court
making health care decisions.8
Although Chapter 658 provides statutory standards to govern how a surrogate
decision-maker makes health care decisions on behalf of the incapacitated patient,
it does not provide a method to determine who makes health care decisions for
incapacitated patients lacking advance directives.' When initially introduced in the
Legislature, Chapter 658 contained a surrogate decision-making scheme to address
"family consent" and to provide a procedure that would enable a surrogate
committee to make decisions when the patient did not have an advance directive or
a surrogate.182 The plan employed a hierarchical list of family and friends similar
to that provided in intestate succession laws to address who would make health care
174. Id. § 4665(d)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 658).
175. Compare iU. § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658) (requiring that a surrogate make all health care decisions
in accordance with the patient's instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the surrogate, and
otherwise in the best interests of the patient considering the patient's personal values to the extent known to the
surrogate), with id. § 2355(a) (enacted by Chapter 658) (stating that the conservator must make all health care
decisions in accordance with the patient's instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the
conservator, and otherwise in the best interests of the conservatee considering the conservatee's personal values
to the extent known to the conservator), and iU. § 3208(c)(I)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 658) (allowing the court to
order the withholding or withdrawal of health care if the court determines that such action is in accordance with
the patient's best interests, considering the patient's personal values to the extent known to the petitioner).
176. Id. § 3208(cX1) (amended by Chapter 658).
177. Id. § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 2355(a) (amended by Chapter 658).
180. lit § 3208(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 658).
181. See d. § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658) (stating:
A surrogate, including a person acting as a surrogate, shall make a health care decision in accordance
with the patient's individual health care instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to
the surrogate. Otherwise, the surrogate shall make the decision in accordance with the surrogate's
determination of the patient's best interest. In determining the patient's best interest, the surrogate shall
consider the patient's personal values to the extent known to the surrogate.).
182. AB 891 (1999) (as introduced on Feb. 25, 1999, but not enacted).
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decisions in the event that a person becomes incapacitated without an advance
directive.
183
A priority scheme applied rigidly could defeat the fundamental principle that
decisions should be made in accordance with the patient's wishes, or, if not known,
in the patient's best interests. 84 For example, under a rigidly applied priority
scheme, the family of an incapacitated patient would be consulted to make health
care decisions despite the fact that the patient had been estranged from her family
for years and has a "significant other" more acquainted with the patient's wishes.'S
The proposed scheme would have avoided such problems and would have provided
flexibility by requiring the primary physician to select the surrogate based on
statutorl standards focusing on the patient's best interests and the preservation of
the fundamental principles of self-determination.!
For patients without surrogates, the precursor to Chapter 658 initially proposed
a scheme under which a surrogate committee was to be established by health care
institutions. 7 The formation of surrogate committees was intended to address one
of the most important problems for health care providers-the problem of who
makes health care decisions for the incapacitated patient who has no family, friends,
or advance directive.'l 8 As enacted, Chapter 658 directs how health care decisions
are made for those patients who are incapacitated but issues involving who will
make those decisions in the absence of an advance directive have yet to be
addressed. 89
D. Court-Appointed Conservatorship
Chapter 658 makes minor revisions in California's highly developed
Guardianship-Conservatorship Law.19° Most of the revisions are technicalities made
to promote consistency between the Guardianship-Conservatorship Law and the
Health Care Decisions Law passed by Chapter 658.191 Of greatest significance is the
amendment to Probate Code section 2355, adopting the terminology of Chapter 658
to clarify that a conservator is authorized to make all health care decisions,
including the withholding and withdrawing of life support.192 Chapter 658 also adds
the standard that governs all other decision-makers: decisions must be based on the
183. Id. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401-6402 (West 1991) (providing that intestate succession shall be in
the following order: wife, children, parent, sibling, grandparent, aunt or uncle, step child, and next of kin).
184. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 33-34.
185. Id.
186. AB 891 (1999) (as introduced on Feb. 25, 1999, but not enacted).
187. Id.
188. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 37-40.
189. SENATE JuDiCiARY CoMMirrE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS of AB 891, at 9 (July 13, 1999).
190. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2105,2355-2356 (amended by Chapter 658).
191. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 17 n.13.
192. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (amended by Chapter 658).
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conservatee's desires, if known, or based on a determination of the conservatee's
best interests, considering the personal values of the conservatee. 93
E. Judicial Determination of the Rendering of Health Care Services
California case law reveals a clear disapproval of judicial health care decision-
making;194 nevertheless, as a last resort, Chapter 658 reserves a mechanism for
providing a judicial remedy for the difficult cases that cannot otherwise be
resolved. 95 The law continues to provide a judicial remedy other than
conservatorship to authorize medical treatment while safeguarding the basic rights
of the patient.196 Chapter 658 expands the court's authority to include not only
consent for recommended treatment, but also refusal-the withholding or
withdrawing-of all forms of health care on behalf of the patient, if (1) such a
decision is in accordance with the patient's best interests, considering the patient's
personal values to the extent known to the petitioner; and (2) the patient is unable
to consent to the recommended health care.' 97
F. The Optional Statutory Advance Directive Form
Chapter 658 provides a four-part advance directive form that includes an easily
understood explanation of each part, an explanation of the duties of a designated
agent, and instructions for signing the form, including an explanation of witnessing
requirements or notarization requirements."8 The use of this form is optional, and
does not exclude the possibility of using additional or different forms.' 99
Part I of the form, the power of attorney for health care, allows the designation
of an agent to make health care decisions and the designation of alternates if the
agent's authority is revoked or the agent is unwilling to make the health care
decisions as directed.200 This Part also allows the declarant to determine the scope
of the agent's authority by limiting or not limiting the types of health care decisions
193. Ma
194. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984) (affirming
that no advance court approval is necessary for a surrogate to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,1021,195 Cal. Rptr. 484,493 (1983) (declaring that
prior judicial approval is not necessary in order to legally withdraw treatment).
195. Compare 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 79, sec. 14, at 646-47 (enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 3208)(a)-(b))
(allowing the courts to authorize a recommended course of medical treatment and to designate a person to give
consent for the treatment on behalf of the patient, but only when the patient lacks the capacity to give an informed
consent), with CAL. PROB. CODE § 3208(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 658) (perpetuating the same mechanism by
which the court appoints a surrogate decision-maker).
196. Supra note 195.
197. CAL. PROB. CODE § 3208(c)(1)(2) (amended by Chapter 658).
198. Id. § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
199. Id. § 4700 (enacted by Chapter 658).
200. Il § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
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that can be made by the agent, determining a time or event that will actuate the
power of attorney, and providing for after-death anatomical gifts. 201 Finally, Part I
provides for the nomination of a conservator in the event one is required. 2
Part II of the form allows the declarant to give specific instructions regarding
the choice to prolong or not prolong life, the treatment of pain, and any other
specific directive, by checking a specified box or by adding written instructions.0 3
Part III of the form allows the declarant to express wishes regarding organ
donation.2°" If this portion of the form is left blank, no anatomical gifts will be
permitted unless an agent has been designated to make all health care decisions and
authorizes an anatomical gift.2t5 Finally, Part IV allows the appointment of a
primary physician and alternate physicians. 206 The form concludes with the
witnessing requirements of Chapter 658, which allow an ombudsman or patient
advocate to be a witness if the declarant is a patient in a skilled nursing facility.0 7
G. Duties of Health Care Providers
Chapter 658 requires health care providers and institutions to follow the
patient's advance directive and decisions made by the patient's surrogate decision-
maker as if the patient had made the decision herself while competent. 08 Thus,
health care providers have a duty to determine whether or not a patient has an
advance directive or a designated surrogate.209 Further, the existence of an advance
directive must be recorded as part of the patient's record so that all those providing
care will be informed of the directive's existence.2t0
If a health care provider does not wish to comply with a patient's advanced
directive due to personal conscientious reason or because such compliance is
against institutional policy, the provider may decline.21' However, such non-
compliance imposes a duty upon the health care provider to promptly notify the





205. See id. (providing that, unless the form signed limits authority of one's agent, such agent may make
all health care decisions, including whether to donate anatomical gifts); see also SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMIrTtE ANALYSIs OFAB 891, at 6 (July 13, 1999) (reporting that blanks left on the optional organ donation
form mean that "no anatomical gifts would be permitted").
206. CAL PROB. CODE § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 4733 (enacted by Chapter 658).
209. Health care providers have an implied duty to determine whether the patient has an advance directive
or a designated surrogate based on the duty to comply with the patient's health care instructions. Ua. The provider
must determine if the directive is written, find out where a copy can be obtained, and promptly record its
existence. Id § 4731 (enacted by Chapter 658). Verbal directives must also be recorded in the patient's record. Id.
210. Id. § 4731(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
211. I § 4734 (enacted by Chapter 658).
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another health care institution.2 2 Health care providers and institutions also have
a duty to continue to provide care until the patient is transferred.2 3 If the health care
provider determines that a transfer cannot be made, the provider has a duty to
provide appropriate palliative care.214 A health care provider does not have a duty,
however, to provide "medically ineffective health care" or care that is inconsistent
with accepted health care standards.
215
H. Liabilities of Health Care Providers and Others
Chapter 658 provides that health care providers and institutions will not be
civilly or criminally liable if they act in good faith and in accordance with accepted
health care standards.21 6 However, if a health care provider intentionally refuses to
follow a patient's advance directive without doing so because of a conscientious
reason or an institutional policy, the health care provider will be subject to liability
to the aggrieved person for $2,500, or the amount of actual damages suffered by the
aggrieved person, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees.217 Any
"person who intentionally falsifies, forges, conceals, defaces, or obliterates" an
advance directive without consent, or fraudulently induces a person to give or not
give an advance directive, or coerces her into doing so, is subject to $10,000 or
actual damages suffered, depending on whichever is greater, plus reasonable
attorney's fees.218
L Miscellaneous Technical and Procedural Provisions
The California Health Care Decisions Law perpetuates the previously existing
law that recognizes the advance directives of other states by acknowledging all
written advance directives.2t 9 Chapter 658 also renews the special procedure
controlling requests to forego resuscitative measures by making minor revisions of
definitions to provide consistency with the new law.220 Finally, Chapter 658
212. l. § 4736(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 658).
213. Id. § 4736(c) (enacted by Chapter 658).
214. 1L
215. See iL § 4735 (enacted by Chapter 658) (allowing the health care provider to refuse to provide medical
treatment that is futile or non-beneficial to the patient).
216. 1&. § 4740 (enacted by Chapter 658).
217. IL § 4742(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
218. ld. § 4742(b) (enacted by Chapter 658).
219. Ld. § 4676 (enacted by Chapter 658).
220. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 966, sec. 3, at 3-4 (enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 4753) (providing three
ways to show evidence of "a request to forgo resuscitative measures": (1) by a written document signed by both
the individual or a surrogate decision-maker and a physician; (2) by a completed pre-hospital "do not resuscitate"
form; or (3) by a medallion engraved with the words "do not resuscitate" or the letters "DNR," which identifies
the patient and gives a toll-free number to call for validation through the Emergency Medical Services Authority),
with CAL. PROB. CODE § 4780 (enacted by Chapter 658) (continuing the former section without significant change,
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continues the registry for powers of attorney for health care, but adds provisions for
the registration of individual health care instructions. t
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 658
The need for health care legislation that fosters self-determination meets with
and creates several problems.tm One problem is getting a significant number of
Californians to execute an advance directive.2m Another problem is ensuring that
an advance directive is followed in the event of incapacitation.2 4 A third problem
is ameliorating conflicts that may arise between a health care provider's moral
beliefs and the beliefs of the principal as they are declared in an advance
directiveY5 Finally, decision-making for those who are incapacitated without
having executed an advance directive is a problem of significant proportions
because so few people have executed advance directives.226 This Part will address
these problems individually, and will discuss Chapter 658's ability or lack thereof
to solve the problems.
A. Promoting Increased Execution of Advance Directives
The best way for a person to convey her wishes regarding health care once she
finds herself incapacitated is to have executed an advance directive while
competent. 227 Although the execution of an advance directive promotes self-
determination, only ten to twenty percent of U.S. adults currently have advance
directives in the form of a living will or a durable power of attorney for health
care.m To promote the increased use of advance directives, Chapter 658, the new
Health Care Decisions Law, combines and extends the provisions of the previously
existing durable power of attorney for health care and the living will of the Natural
but adding the phrase "for the individual" to the end of subsection (aXI) for clarity).
221. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1280, sec. 2, at 2-3 (enacting CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4800-4806)
(establishing the registry of persons who have executed a written advance directive), with CAL. PROB. CODE §§
4800-4806 (re-enacted by Chapter 658) (continuing the provisions for the registry).
222. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 11-13.
223. See id. at 16 (reporting that about 80% of U.S. adults have not executed an advance directive).
224. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 190-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1984)
(detailing the physicians' refusal to follow a patient's wishes to withdraw artificial ventilation despite
overwhelming evidence, including a living will, of the patient's wishes to do so).
225. See, e.g., L at 195-96, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26 (discussing the conflicts that arose when the moral
and ethical beliefs of the doctors and hospital opposed those of the patient, and exploring the unsuccessful
attempts to strike a compromise).
226. REvISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 16.
227. Id. at 18.
228. Id. at 16.
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Death Act. 229 The goal is to make the law easier to understand and apply than the
prior provisions for health care decision-making. m
The new law provides a clearer and more specific meaning of the phrase "health
care decisions" than did the existing law.2' Chapter 658 makes clear the fact that
artificial nutrition and hydration can be refused232 The optional statutory form
appears much less technical, and incorporates easily understood introductory
explanations. z a Moreover, it is comprehensive, as it includes provisions for the
designation of alternate agents,234 the choice of a conservator if needed in the
future,2-5 the donation of anatomical body parts,2" and the enumeration of alternate
primary physicians. 27 The featured statutory form is likely to encourage health care
planning and increase the number of people executing advance directives because
229. Compare 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 895, sec. 3, at 3973-80 (amending CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-
7194.5 and enacting HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186) (allowing both permanent unconsciousness and terminal
illness to trigger the actuation of advance directives), with CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4805 (enacted by Chapter
658) (replacing the Natural Death Act with a more comprehensive law that recognizes each person's fundamental
right to control his or her own health care, and allowing advance directives to become effective immediately upon
the patient's express request or at some future time of incapacitation); compare also 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 896, secs.
1-5, at 3980-91 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2433, 2436.5, 2444, 2500, 2503.5) (continuing to provide the
durable power of attorney as a mechanism for the appointment of an agent to make health care decisions on behalf
of the declarant in the event of the declarant's incapacitation, and eliminating the time limit on the duration of a
durable power of attorney), with CAL. PROB. CODE§§ 4600-4752 (enacted by Chapter 658) (expanding the power
of attorney for health care provision by allowing the designation of alternate agents and the "customization" of
events that the specific patient wants to trigger actuation of the power of attorney).
230. SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMrrTEE,COMMITTEE ANALYSISOFAB 891, at 1 (July 13, 1999).
231. Compare 1994 Cal. Stat ch. 307, sec. 16, at 34 (enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 4612) (defining "health
care decisions" broadly as consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent for any health care), with CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4617 (enacted by Chapter 658) (stating that "health care decisions" include: "[s]election and
discharge of health care providers and institutions;" "[aipproval or disapproval of diagnostic tests, surgical
procedures, and programs of medication;" and "[d]irections to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration and all other forms of health care, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation").
232. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4617(c) (enacted by Chapter 658).
233. Id. § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658). The form declares:
Part 1 of this form is a power of attorney for health care. Part I lets you name another individual as
agent to make health care decisions for you if you become incapable of making your own decisions
or if you want someone else to make those decisions for you now even though you are still capable.
You may also name an alternate agent to act for you if your first choice is not willing, able, or







of its convenience2 8 and its relatively easy-to-understand language.29 Whether the
number of people who execute advance directives will significantly increase as a
result of Chapter 658's provisions is yet to be determined, but if this law has the
same effect as did the Federal law that required providers to inform patients as to
the possibility of drafting an advance directive,24°then one can expect Chapter 658's
simplification of the drafting process to have a minor impact on that number.24
An increase in the number of individuals executing advance directives would
benefit both health care providers and the court system by providing clear direction
to health care providers, thereby reducing the need for judicial intervention. 42
Perhaps more importantly, an advance directive under Chapter 658 would limit the
suffering felt by the families of incapacitated adults.2 43 The comprehensiveness of
Chapter 658 promises to make the task of the health care provider easier as well,
because all of the patient's wishes regarding health care decision-making will be
included in a single document.2"4
238. For example, using the optional statutory form is more convenient than expressing decisions regarding
anatomical gift donation on a driver's license, executing a living will to direct life-sustaining measures on one
document, executing a power of attorney for health care on another document, and completing a form in order to
forego resuscitation measures.
239. Compare 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 895, sec. 2, at 3975-76 (enacting CAL. HEALTH& SAFr CODE § 7186.5)
(requiring a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of life support to contain words to the following
effect:
If I should have an incurable and irreversible condition that has been diagnosed by two physicians and
that will result in my death within a relatively short time without the administration of life-sustaining
treatment or has produced an irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state, and I am no longer able
to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the
Natural Death Act of California, to withhold or withdraw treatment, including artificially administered
nutrition and hydration, that only prolongs the process of dying or the irreversible coma or persistent
vegetative state and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain),
with CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (enacting Chapter 658) (providing a "check the box" form with options for (1) the
choice not to prolong life or (2) the choice to prolong life, prefacing the form with the following: "If you fill out
this part of the form, you may strike any wording you do not want").
240. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
241. See Edward. J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History and
Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 249, 276-77 (1997) (reporting that
the impact of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (PSDA)-a
federal law requiring that health care providers distribute written information about advance directives to all
patients on admission-on the number of people executing advance directives was insignificant, but suggesting
that the number of people who are aware of advance directives are 33% to 50% higher than the number of people
who have executed advance directives).
242. See Letter from Judith J. Citko, Director of Continuing Care Services, California Healthcare
Association, to Elaine AIquist, California Assemblymember (Apr. 16, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (observing that the bill giving rise to Chapter 658 will "address situations in which healthcare providers
are now required to obtain judicial adjudication... [that] is time consuming and not in patients' best interest").
243. Cf Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1993) (commenting that close family
members have strong feelings about the continuation of a loved one's life when that life is "hopeless, meaningless,
and even degrading").
244. See CAL PROB. CODE § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658) (allowing for a single document to house the
patient's directions).
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Although Chapter 658 drew heavily from the UHCDA of 1993,245 the California
Legislature deviated from that law by continuing to apply the formal requirements
of witnessing or notarizing and dating advance directives.246 The California Law
Revision Commission initially sponsored the Health Care Decisions Law with the
dating and witnessing formalities excluded.247 Proponents of these formalities
argued that the requirements decreased the possibility of fraud.2' As enacted,
Chapter 65 8 contains witnessing and dating requirements, and the optional statutory
form provides easily understood instructions to promote compliance with the
requirements.249
B. Complying with Advance Directives Without Impinging on the Conscientious
Objections of the Health Care Providers
Chapter 658 is a neutral statute which allows the declarant to state by advance
directives her individual desires concerning both the continuation and the cessation
of treatment.2 Nevertheless, the new law does not require the health care provider
to render aid that is inconsistent with accepted standards of care21or that is
medically ineffective.z2 Chapter 658 honors the beliefs of health care providers by
allowing the health care provider or institution to decline to comply with an
individual's advance directive when such directive is inconsistent with the
provider's or institution's beliefs or policies.z 3 The new law also continues to
promote the patient's right to self-determination by requiring that the health care
provider meet three conditions when denying compliance.? First, the health care
provider must communicate its contrary policies in a timely fashion to the patient
245. SENATEJUDICIARY COMMrTEE, COMMTrEEANALYSIS OFAB 891, at 2 (July 13,1999); see also supra
notes 47-49 (detailing the UHCDA of 1993).
246. Compare UNIF. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS AcT, § 4 (1993) (recommending but not requiring witnesses
to such signatures), with CAL. PROB. CODE § 4673 (enacted by Chapter 658) (requiring witnesses or notarization).
247. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 19-20.
248. See Letter from Dana Cody, Executive Director, Life Legal Defense Foundation, to Assemblymember
Alquist (May 24, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (advocating the requirement of dating and
witnessing or authentication to protect against potential fraud, duress, and forgery); see also Letter from Edward
E. Dolejsi, Executive Director, California Catholic Conference, to Assemblymember Alquist (Apr. 16, 1999) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (calling for the statutory requirement of witnesses, and arguing that
streamlining the process by excluding the witness formalities would elevate the value of property over questions
of life or death). But see REVISION COIM'N, supra note 43, at 19 (noting the arguments of those who feel that
such execution requirements are "overly restrictive" and unnecessarily diminish the number of advance directives
that will ultimately be executed).
249. CAL PROB. CODE § 4701 (enacted by Chapter 658).
250. California Law Revision Commission, Questions and Answers: AB 891 (Health Care Decisions Law)
2 (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
251. CAL PROB. CODE § 4654 (enacted by Chapter 658).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 4734(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
254. Id. §§ 4734(b), 4736 (enacted by Chapter 658).
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or to a person authorized to make decisions for the patient.2 5 Second, the health
care provider must make "all reasonable efforts" to transfer the patient to a facility
that will comply with the advance directive.z 6 Third, the health care provider must
continue "appropriate pain relief and other palliative care" if the patient cannot be
transferred or a delay in transfer has occurred. 7
Accordingly, parties in cases such as Bartling v. Superior Court25 would not
have to resort to judicial intervention.2 9 By codifying the individual right to make
health care decisions including those regarding life-sustaining treatment, 260 the new
law is likely to decrease the burden on the courts with respect to cases presenting
the need for determinations regarding the patient's wishes under the given
circumstances. 26'
C. Ensuring Adherence to an Advance Directive
Chapter 658 lends credence to the concept that an advance directive can indeed
effectuate a patient's wishes during a time of incapacitation by codifying a number
of duties of health care providers and institutions.262 The new law will motivate
health care providers to follow advance directives not only because the law requires
compliance, but also because Chapter 658 states that any health care provider who
violates the advance directive will be subject to liability in the amount of at least
$2,500.263 Chapter 658's requirements for record-keeping are not likely to impose
new duties on health care providers because the federal Self-Determination Act
already requires that health care providers ask about advance directives upon the
patient's admission to the facility, include copies of an advance directive in the
patient's records, and provide patient information in those records regarding the
execution of an advance directive.265 However, the new imposition of civil liability
may provide even more incentive for health care providers to fulfill these existing
duties.266
255. IaU §4734(b).
256. Id. §4736(b) (enacted by Chapter 658).
257. Id. § 4736(c) (enacted by Chapter 653).
258. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1983); see supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the Batting case).
259. Not only was Mr. Batling competent, but he also had an advance directive. Bardting, 163 Cal. App.
3d at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. Still, the physicians and the hospital refused to comply with his wishes due to
their "moral and ethical objections" and "fear of liability." Id.
260. CAL PROB. CODE § 4650(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 658).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97 (discussing the provisions of Chapter 658 that involve
judicial determination of health care decisions).
262. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4730-4736 (enacted by Chapter 658).
263. Id. § 4742(a) (enacted by Chapter 658).
264. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
265. Id.
266. CAL PROB. CODE § 4742(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 658).
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D. Decision-Making for Those Who Are Incapacitated Without Having Executed
an Advance Directive
The Health Care Decisions Law is intended by its sponsors to "fufill the
incapacitated patient's desires and best interest without resort to judicial
proceedings, except as a last resort."267 If everyone planned ahead for a time of
incapacitation by executing an advance directive, the stated goal of this new law
would be fulfilled.268 Unfortunately, a substantial majority of people do not execute
advance directives.2 9
The members of this majority will fall into one of two subgroups if they
become incapacitated: (1) the subgroup encompassing the incapacitated adult who
is without an advance directive but who has family, friends, or "significant others"
to make decisions for her; or (2) the incapacitated adult who is without an advance
directive and has no friends or family to make decisions for her.270 Chapter 658, to
its detriment, makes no provision for determining who can make decisions for
members of either of these groups, apart from judicial intervention.27'
Neither California statutory law nor California case law clearly determines who
makes the health care decisions for incapacitated adults who have not executed an
advance directive.272 While the federal Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990273
provides for a patient information pamphlet that is used to provide information
regarding advance directives to patients on admission to the hospital, and states in
relevant part, "If you can't make treatment decisions, your doctor will ask your
closest available relative or friend to help decide what is best for you," 274 the
California Law Revision Commission expresses doubt that California law actually
requires that the closest available relative or friend be consulted.275
Although Chapter 658 does not answer the question regarding who is to make
the decisions for the incapacitated person without an advance directive, it does
provide a uniform standard for the way a decision will be made for these
267. Letter from Stan Ulrich, Assistant Executive Secretary, California Law Revision Commission, to
Bonnie Darwin, Consultant, Assembly Committee on Aging (Apr. 15, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
268. See id. (stating that the guiding principle of the new Health Care Decisions Law is "to effectuate the
stated desires of the patient, as set out in an advance directive or, in the absence of a directive, as made known
to the surrogate decisionmaker").
269. See REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 24 (observing that fewer than one-fifth of America's adults
have written advance directives).
270. Letter from Leah V. Granof, Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of
California, to Larry Doyle, Chief Legislative Counsel, State Bar Office of Governmental Affairs (Mar. 10, 1999)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
271. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 37.
272. Id. at 29.
273. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
274. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 43, at 29.
275. See id. at 30. But 4 id. (conceding that, while consulting the closest available relative or friend may
not be required by California law, such consultation is the usual practice among health care providers).
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individuals.276 Chapter 658 standardizes the method by which health care decisions
are to b- made regardless of whether such decisions are made by an agent named
in the patient's advanced directive, a family member or friend acting as a surrogate
decision-maker, a public guardian, or the court.27 Every surrogate or acting
surrogate is required to
make a health care decision in accordance with the patient's individual
health care instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the
surrogate. Otherwise, the surrogate shall make the decision in accordance
with the surrogate's determination of the patient's best interest. In
determining the patient's best interest, the surrogate shall consider the
patient's personal values to the extent known to the surrogate.278
Despite this reform, because California law remains unclear regarding who may
speak for the incapacitated adult who does not have an advance directive, the usual
practice in health care of consulting the family regarding the treatment of an
incapacitated person who does not have an advance directive will continue not to
have the force of law to require its performance.279
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 658 recognizes the right of a competent adult to make her own health
care decisions, including the refusal of medical treatment, should incapacity to
make such decisions later befall her.210 The new law also consolidates, updates, and
simplifies the mechanisms by which a competent adult may plan with an advance
directive for the possibility of incapacitation."1 Those mechanisms consist of
written health care instructions concerning life-sustaining treatments, powers of
attorney, appointment of a primary physician, wishes regarding anatomical gift
donation, and wishes regarding resuscitation.1 2
Unfortunately, the majority of Californians have not executed advance
directives. 3 While Chapter 658 provides uniform standards to ensure that "best
interests" decisions are made on behalf of the incapacitated person without an
advance directive, it falls short of providing guidelines for determining who should
276. CAL PROB. CODE § 4684 (enacted by Chapter 658).
277. Id. §§ 4684,4701 (enacted by Chapter 658); id. § 3208 (amended by Chapter 658).
278. Id. § 4714 (enacted by Chapter 658).
279. See supra note 275 (explaining that health care practitioners commonly consult the patient's family
in such situations).
280. d. § 4650 (enacted by Chapter 658).
281. Supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
282. Supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
283. Supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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make those decisions.2 Without instructions as to who should make decisions for
an incapacitated individual who has not issued an advance directive, most health
care decisions involving conflict will continue to be governed on a case-by-case
basis in court decisions, and health care providers will continue to function without
the reassurance of clear legal rules in the area.'
284. Supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
285. Supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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[Tihe need to make 'rational' health care policy has been the obsession of
this country for decades. The debate has centered around the desirability
of providing health care for as many people as... possible .... At the
same time, we are a society obsessed with not dying. [TIhis... is about the
impossible contradiction between these strong societal obsessions.'
1. Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp. 477,482 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Health care costs in America are colossal.2 As the nation's population ages,3 the
costs will only continue to increase.4 These increasing costs have forced health care
institutions and employers to seek alternatives to the traditional fee-for-service
method of delivering care.5
Recent years have seen managed care organizations (MCOs) enjoy at least
some success in controlling increasing costs. 6 Managed care, which includes Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) as well as many other corporate forms,
generally combines three attributes to attempt to bring costs under control: (1) it
limits the patient's ability to choose providers; (2) it employs "utilization reviews"
to oversee patient and provider health care decisions; and (3) it uses financial
incentives to induce providers to select less costly services.7 This last technique
frequently comes in a form termed "capitation," which is a set price paid to the
provider per member, per month, regardless of the cost of care for that member.8
Therefore, the provider has the incentive to reduce costs and bears the risk of
having to provide expensive care to patients.
The success managed care has achieved in this country9 has not come without
resulting costs in other forms: namely, a public opinion backlash against MCOs, l0
and, more recently, bankruptcies of physician groups." Currently, California leads
2. See Pace of Health-Care Spending Declined in '96, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 13, 1998, at A6,
available in 1998 WL 3986220 (reporting that in 1996, health care spending in America represented 13.6% of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and $1.035 trillion).
3. See US Census Bureau: Nation's MedianAge Highest Ever; W1est Virginia Oldest State, CensusBureau
Says, M2 PRESSWIRE, June 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21025165 (citing a Census Bureau report finding that
"[t]he median age in the U.S. was 35.2 years in 1998, the highest ever"); cf HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW,
AGING MEDICARE POPULATION: CYS 1978-96 30 (reporting that the percentage of the U.S. population 65 years
or older was 11.3% in 1980, 12.8% in 1995, and will be 20.4% in 2030).
4. See US. Health Care Spending to Soar over Next 10 Years, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 15, 1998,
at A6, available in 1998 WL 20047821 (citing a Department of Health and Human Services report predicting that
in 2007, health care spending will account for 16.6% of the GDP, at $2.1 trillion).
5. Jan L. Weinstock, Competitive Providers ofManaged Healthcare, NJ. LAWYER, Feb. 1987, at 11.
6. Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587,
593 (1997).
7. RAND E. RosENBLArr Er AL, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTM,1 996 (1997).
8. SUE BERKMAN, THE ABCS OF HMOs 217 (1997).
9. Cf. Jeffrey O'Connell & James F Neale, HMO's Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New
Malpract~ce Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 287 (1998) (suggesting that
HMOs have reduced medical costs by eliminating automatic payment for unnecessary procedures, discouraging
over-utilization of emergency rooms, and imposing administrative discipline on doctors previously beyond
reproach).
10. See BERKMAN, supra note 8, at 591 (asserting that the political legitimacy of MCO is very much in
question, and that many observers are not comfortable with the quality of care being provided).
11. See Sharon Bemstein, Proposal Has No Cure for Physician Groups Regulation, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 21,
1999, at Cl, available in 1999 WL 2188530 (reporting that, in the last three years, 115 California physician
groups have either declared bankruptcy or gone out of business, and that 85% are estimated to be in serious
financial trouble).
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the nation in MCO membership.1 2 Therefore, the battles fought in this State over
how best to fix the problems of managed care-and the entire health care
system-have encouraged a tremendous marshaling of resources on all sides of the
issue in hopes of influencing the outcomes of similar contests in state houses
around the nation and in Washington, D.C.
1 3
In 1999, the reform movement in California evoked emotion and passion in
many."4 For some, the lobbying at the California State Capitol during the summer
of 1999 took a surprising twist.t5 As posturing and negotiating occurred in the
Legislature, a conservative approach by the Governor left some questioning
whether the time for substantive reform was in fact at hand.1 6 Notwithstanding the
Governor's slowing of the pace, health care reformers were optimistic about their
chances for long-term improvement under the Davis administration, 7 and the
reforms that did emerge seem to have substantially reconciled differences among
the interested groups."8 Now that the dust has settled somewhat and reforms have
been enacted, the question that remains is: when the new laws have had time to take
effect, will the California system be any healthier?
12. See Scott Lindlaw, Where Will Former Special-Interest Watchdog Lead the HMO Industry?, AP
NEwswiREs, June 4, 1999, at I (acknowledging California as the HMO leader in terms of enrollment numbers);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.1(a)(1) (West 1994) (stating that "[m]ore than 16 million Californians are
enrolled in health care service plans, and that this number is likely to grow"); Chris Rauber, California Governor
Proposes Reforms, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 23,1999, at 4 (reporting that California has more than 20 million
managed care enrollees).
13. See Lindlaw, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing the California Association of Health Plans' (CAHP) public
image campaign involving a high profile convert to the side of managed care); see also Dorsey Griffith, State
HMO Reform Prepares to Enter the Spotlight, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 3, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL
4439018 (reporting that the CAHP has softened its traditionally outspoken opposition to most major reform
proposals in hopes of reducing the number of proposals that pass); Rauber, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that "[w]hat
California does could have a huge impact nationally").
14. See Dan Waiters, HMOs Loom as Sexy Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 4,1999, at A4, available in 1999
WL 4421645 (regarding the HMO debate as evoking primal emotion and attracting consumer advocates, doctors,
hospitals, personal injury lawyers, and politicians); Peter G. Bourdeau, Managed Care Facing Stiffer Competition,
Bus. J.-PHOENIX, Mar. 20, 1998, at 47 (reporting that "[b]ashing managed care is all the rage... among
politicians and patients alike"); see e.g., Lindlaw, supra note 12, at 1 (reporting that a movie actress's on-screen
tirade directed at an HMO struck a nerve in a nation frustrated with the managed care system).
15. See Carl Ingrain, Davis Urges Slowdown on Health Care Reform Legislation, L. A. TIMES, July 15,
1999, at A3, available in 1999 WL 2177460 (reporting that Governor Davis's reluctant stance toward the
approximately 60 bills then passing through the Legislature would be surprising to some).
16. See Dena Bunis & Daniel M. Weintraub, Davis to Take Slow Approach to HMO Reform, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Feb. 24, 1999, at A04, available in 1999 WL 4286212 (quoting Elizabeth Inholz, Director of the
Consumers' Union's California office, as having been "stunned," and State Senator Liz Figueroa as having
interrupted a reporter reading a transcript of the Governor's remarks with: "Oh, my. Oh, my.").
17. See Griffith, supra note 13, at Al (stating that health care reformers hope that the new Governor will
produce what they failed to receive from Republican administrations over the past 16 years).
18. See Rhonda L. Rundle, California's Managed-Care Legislation Generally Draws Industry's Support,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 13,1999, atB4, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 24913508 (reporting that the managed care industry
stated it can generally live with the new California legislation, while consumer advocates hailed the reforms).
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While everyone appears to have an idea about how best to fix health care,' 9 four
new laws have moved managed care reform a significant distance in a particular
direction.20 Again, whether the direction will ultimately prove beneficial for
patients, plans, doctors, personal injury lawyers, or any combination thereof, is yet
to be answered. The current reforms address some of the traditional and well-
documented concerns of the public, physicians, and consumer advocates.2'
However, some issues-including the one that "is at the heart of managed care,
philosophically, financially, and operationally"-have been left largely untouched
by the current legislative efforts.2 The primary issue is the appropriateness of risk-
sharing schemes like capitation, and with it the larger question of who should be
responsible for those demands of the American health care consumer that have fed
and cultivated the national health care appetite.2
According to some, the major thrust of managed care reform in California
during the last couple of years is to attempt to improve regulation, inject
competition into the system to benefit patients and consumers, and advance the
overall quality of care.24 The vehicles that the Legislature chose in the 1999
legislative session to accomplish these goals are: (1) the establishment of an
independent medical review system (IMRS) to review delays or denials of treatment
based on medical necessity or appropriateness;2 (2) the creation of a new
department of managed care to oversee the entire system;26 and, most significantly,
(3) the availability of state law tort suits with the possibility of punitive damages
awards to plaintiffs suing organizations that proximately cause the plaintiffs
19. Id.
20. See infra Parts mII-W (discussing Chapters 525,533,536, and 542).
21. See I MANAGED HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT TASK FORCE, IMPROVING MANAOED HEALTH CARE IN
CALIFORNIA, EXECuTIVESUMARY 25, (1998) (describing the results ofa taskforce-commissioned public survey
and testimony received in hearings, and concluding that improving regulations, making competition function
smoothly for patients and consumers, and improving overall quality of care were the main goals behind managed
care reform); see also Daniel M. Weintraub & Liz Kowalczyk, Davis Eyes Unbiased HMO Check: it's a key aspect
ofthegovernor's driveformanaged-care reforn, ORANGECOUNTYREG., Aug. 20,1999, at Al, available in 1999
WL 43155:32 (reporting that the independent medical review system is intended to resolve a basic conflict with
managed care in that consumers may not be convinced that a profit-driven corporation bases decisions on the
patients' best interests). See generally Jeffrey O'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's Cost Containment, and Early
Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 287, 290-93
(1998) (recounting a well-publicized HMO horror story and discussing a widespread desire to subject MCOs to
civil liability).
22. BERKMAN, supra note 8, at x-xi.
23. See id, at 15 (summarizing an Employee Benefits Institute survey which found that health insurance
is the benefit considered most important by adults when they seek employment); see also Rhonda L. Rundle, Can
Managed Care Manage Costs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1999, at Al (stating that "Americans' definition of their
health care needs is expanding").
24. 1 MANAGED HEALTHCARE IMPROVEdENT TASK FORCE, supra note 21, passim.
25. See infra Parts III.B-C (discussing Chapters 533 and 542).
26. See infra Part III.D (discussing Chapter 525).
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"significant harm" because of delays in, or denials of, "medically necessary"
coverage.27
This Legislative Note analyzes the most recent and pertinent of California's
managed care reform legislation-Chaptes 525,533,536, and 542. Part II discusses
the legal background which framed the debates about reform and sparked some of
the recent public interest in managed care reform. Part I describes the new laws
as enacted, while Part IV analyzes the possible effects of the new laws and
considers several specific issues which the new laws have left unaddressed. This
Legislative Note then concludes by summarizing the issues which underlie many
of the problems with health care in America, and contends that those disagreements




Most of California's existing law regarding MCOs is governed by the Knox-
Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975.29 In 1995, the State Legislature
enacted new measures which provided that providers, managed care organizations,
and any organizations contracting with an MCO are each responsible for their own
acts or omissions, and established that any provision in a contract to the contrary
is void and unenforceable.30 Prior law also required only that every MCO maintain
its own process for review of grievances, subject to approval by the Department of
Corporations.3'
A. Tort Liability
1. State Tort Liability
Traditional tort law uses medical malpractice claims to hold providers of care
liable for harm proximately caused by their negligence.32 Ordinarily, when a person
or organization breaches an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of
recovery, except where otherwise expressly provided by law, is the amount that will
compensate the person or entity for all of the proximately caused damages.33 With
the advent of MCOs and their cost-containment regimens, individual doctors are not
27. See infra Part IlI.A (discussing Chapter 533).
28. Infra Part IV.
29. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1340 (West 1990).
30. Id.
31. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 818, sec. 9, at 2481 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368).
32. Amy Stoecki, Comment, Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas Takes the First Step in Holding
HMOs Liablefor Bad Medical Decisions, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1997).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 902(1982).
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the only overseers deciding a patient's course of treatment.34 However, because
only physicians are legally able to practice medicine, the logical conclusion is that
MCOs cannot be sued for malpractice.35 Notwithstanding this "corporate practice
of medicine" doctrine, some plaintiffs have been successful in recovering against
MCOs, and such suggests that MCOs may be liable for denials of coverage
resulting in harm to patients. 6
2. ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims
While the specters of widespread state tort, enterprise, and vicarious liability
were looming over the managed care industry, courts were recognizing an argument
that MCO defense lawyers made, which forwarded the notion that the Federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)37 preempts many state
tort law claims.38 ERISA regulates all employee benefit plans and "[g]enerally...
supersedes all state laws relating to employee benefit plans," including health
plans.39 Further complicating matters is the fact that ERISA preemption can come
in two forms: "complete preemption" and "conflict preemption." 40 If a state law is
characterized as falling within the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, then it
is deemed preempted, and the plaintiff's claims most likely will be dismissed.4'
Ordinarily, when a defendant asserts a defense of state-law preemption, that
defense is insufficient to warrant removal to federal court.42 However, with ERISA
preemption cases, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception, stating that
"Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint
34. See Jennifer S. Anderson, Comment, All True Histories Contain Instruction: Why HMOs Cannot Avoid
Malpractice Liability Through Independent Contracting with Physicians, 29 MCGEORGEL. REV. 323,326 (1998)
(positing that MCOs provide a system of organizing, delivering, and financing health care).
35. Ellen Wertheimer, Ockham's Scalpel: A Return to a Reasonableness Standard, 43 VILL. L. REV. 321,
330 (1998).
36. See Wictline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1640,239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 820 (1986) (holding that
while a payor (e.g., an MCO) may possibly be legally responsible for harm resulting in denial of coverage, to find
such liability would have been improper in this case); see also Anderson, supra note 34, at 324 ("Plaintiffs have
realized limited success in suing HMOs for physician malpractice under theories of vicarious liability and
ostensible agency."). But c f Wilson v. Blue Cross, 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1990)
(holding that Wickline should be limited to its facts, but that an MCO could be at least partially liable if negligent
conduct hal been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm).
37. ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C.A § 1001-1461. See Neville M. Biliraoria, Beware HMOS: The Future
of HMO Medical Malpractice Liability is Uncertain, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 711,715 (1997) (reporting
that ERISA provides two methods of preemption: complete and conflict preemption).
38. Bilimoria, supra note 37, at 715.
39. Id.; seealso SENATERuLES COMMTrEE, COMMrrrEEANALYsIs of SB 21, at 4 (Sept. 8, 1999) (noting
that an estinated 75-80% of all health insurance enrollees are covered by the ERISA preemption).
40. Bilimoria, supra note 37, at 715.
41. Id.
42. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350,353-54 (3d. Cir. 1995) (discussing the basis for removal
to federal courts in MCO and ERISA preemption cases).
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raising this claim is necessarily federal." 43 After removal, even if a plaintiff can
convince a federal court that her claims do not fall into the "complete preemption"
portion of the civil enforcement provisions and that the court therefore should
remand the case to the state court, the plaintiff still may find her claims at least
partially preempted by ERISA. This is because claims that "relate to" the plan are
invalidated by a provision in ERISA known as "conflict preemption." 44 Even
recovery under ERISA is cold comfort because courts frequently hold that even a
successful plaintiff may only recover contractual damages or the cost of the denied
treatment.45
In the case of a serious affliction, the MCO's denial or delay of treatment may
result in the death of the patient, leaving the understandably bitter family with
practically no chance of substantive redress, and the only deterrent for the MCO
will be the public's perception that the MCO has bloody hands.46 Despite the
occasionally harsh outcomes, 47 courts have looked to the legislative history of
ERISA, decided that Congress's intent in enacting ERISA was to maintain
uniformity in the regulation of employment benefit plans is more compelling, and
rejecting the argument that Congress did not intend such a broad interpretation of
ERISA.48
Despite the United States Supreme Court's direction to courts to apply ERISA
preemption broadly,49 some federal circuits continue to force daylight through the
ERISA curtain,50 developing new theories and interpretations to hold MCOs
43. Id.
44. Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987); see Bilimoria, supra note 37, at 716-17
(explaining ERISA conflict preemption).
45. Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1335 (5th Cir. 1992).
46. Cf e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that after three
cardiologists concurred that Kuhl needed highly specialized surgery at a hospital in another city within a short
time, the health plan canceled his surgery and required a fourth opinion. The fourth doctor also concurred, but by
then, the hospital's surgery staff had been booked for several months. Kuhl's condition deteriorated to the point
the surgery could not have helped, and he died waiting for a transplant.); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324 (recounting
that, after two doctors, one of whom had been the defendant's choice, had determined that the plaintiff, a pregnant
mother, needed round-the-clock hospitalization because of complications, United Health Care would only cover
home nursing care for 10 hours per day. When the nurse was not at the plaintiff's home, the fetus went into
distress and died).
47. See supra note 46 (describing some notable and severe examples of tragic results when care was
withheld care); see also David Espo, House Approves HMO Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS Oct. 7, 1999 (reporting one
congressperson's account of a story of "a young boy who lost his arms and legs to gangrene after his HMO
ordered his parents to drive to a distant emergency room for treatment of a high fever").
48. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1334 (observing that allowing the plaintiff's suit to go forward would
contravene Congress' goal of ensuring that plans and plan sponsors be subject to a uniform body of benefit law).
49. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637,646 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff's claims did not
rest upon the terms of an ERISA plan, and therefore the plaintiff's claims were not entirely preempted); Dukes
v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that ERISA preemption did not reach a claim for
negligent hiring).
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liable.1 The case which seems to have marked the changing direction of the
pendulum 5 2 is Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.53 This 1995 case featured the
consolidation of two separate claims against U.S. Healthcare.54 Both plaintiffs sued
in state court "claiming damages, under various theories, for injuries arising from
medical malpractice of FIMO-affiliated hospitals and medical personnel., 55 As was
typical practice for a defending HMO, the defendants removed the cases to federal
court and argued that the alleged defective medical care was obtained as a benefit
from a welfare-benefit plan governed by ERISA.5 6 The defendants also argued that
removal was proper according to precedent.57 The state trial court permitted
removal, and the federal district court promptly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as
being preempted by ERISA.58
In a marked departure from other circuits,59 the Third Circuit held on appeal
that on the record before it,60 the plaintiffs' claims were not intended "to recover
plan benefits due, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the plan., 61 Therefore,
removal was not necessarily proper, and the fact that complete preemption under
ERISA was not an appropriate grounds for granting a motion to dismiss.62 In
reaching its decision, the Third Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims went to
the quality of the benefits they had received, and that the plaintiffs had not alleged
that benefits were erroneously withheld or that a state court should enforce the
plaintiff's rights under the plans.'
Though Dukes may help permit recovery for some plaintiffs from some MCOs
under conditions similar to the plaintiffs in these cases, the decision raised an
important question: what are "the benefits due" under an ERISA plan-membership
in an MCO, or the actual care arranged for the plaintiff by the MCO and its
51. See Julie K. Locke, The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sie MCOs for Wrongful Treatment
Decisions, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1042-43 (1999) (discussing recent case law permitting suits based on MCO
breach of fiduciary duty).
52. See ROSENBLATr Er AL, supra note 7, at 1032, 1042 (stating that most federal district courts seem to
be following the lead set in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995)).
53. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 350.
59. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (evaluating significant rulings upholding preemption).
60. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350 (stating that in determining whether the state law claims fall within the scope
of § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, a court must determine whether the claims are to recover benefits due, and that in
making that determination, the court would be better prepared if it has a complete understanding, in each case,
of the relationships between the HMO, the employer, and the provider).
61. Id. at 358.
62. Id. at 361
63. Id. at 356.
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providers? 64 Even though the court accepted arguendo the MCO's theory that the
"benefit" is the care provided, the issue may continue to be litigated.6 Therefore,
despite the apparent headway that Dukes makes, it offers insufficient guidance to
lower courts. Courts may continue to struggle both with questions concerning the
scope of duties that an MCO owes the patient, and with questions concerning
exactly which claims may be successful against an MCO. 66
B. Grievance Resolution
Prior law required every health care service plan to establish and maintain a
system for reviewing patient grievances, and the Department of Corporations was
responsible for approving the decisions emanating from the internal grievance
system.67 The law also established timelines for the processing of claims and
grievances (usually sixty days), and accelerated the steps to be taken in cases of
medical urgency by providing for a mandatory expedited review process.68 MCOs
also had to utilize a reasonable external, independent review of coverage decisions
regarding experimental therapies for individuals with terminal conditions.69 In cases
of violation of the laws governing the practices of MCOs, the Corporations
Commissioner had the ability to levy fines not exceeding $250,000.7o
C. Managed Care Oversight
Historically, the California Department of Corporations (DOC) had oversight
responsibility for all managed care organizations doing business in the State.7' The
enforcement of the Knox-Keene Act had been vested in the State Corporations
Commissioner; the Attorney General's usual ability to enforce state law was
preempted by the Act.72 Prior law provided that the functions of the DOC and the
Department of Insurance with regard to health care service plans were distinct, but
that before adopting regulations pursuant to its authority under the Act, the
64. ROSENBLATr Er AL, supra note 7 at 1029; see Dukes, 57 .3d at 356 (suggesting that a more
appropriate determination would include an evaluation of the complete record, but that the court will accept the
defendant's view, for the sake of argument, that the health care, rather than the membership, was the benefit
provided under the plan).
65. ROSENBLATT Er AL, supra note 7, at 1029.
66. See id. at 1043 n.80 (suggesting that because the most recent court decisions do not set forth a bright-
line rule or test to determine the scope of ERISA preemption, preemption should be determined on a case-by-case
basis).
67. 1998 Cal. Stat. ch. 377 at 93 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1368, 1386.02).
68. Id. sec. I at 93.
69. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 979, sec. 3, at (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETy CODE § 1370.4).
70. Id.
71. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 652, at 1606 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1340).
72. lId
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Commissioner was required to consult with the Insurance Commissioner to ensure
consistency of regulations.
73
ImI. THE NEW LAWS: CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANAGED CARE REFORM
Chapters 525, 533,536, and 542 take several steps toward reaching some of the
most popular goals of MCO reform.74 Chapter 536, the Managed Health Care
Insurance Accountability Act of 1999,75 attempts to create new judicial remedies
for plaintiffs who have been harmed by an MCO's refusal to provide, or to pay for,
a medically necessary health care service.76 Chapter 533 creates and establishes
guidelines for the operation of a new independent medical review system (IMRS)
to hear appeals from consumers denied coverage for a particular treatment, and
requires that health plans pay for the costs of the IMRS.77 Closely tied to Chapter
533 is Chapter 542, which requires the creation or reform of dispute resolution
procedures to address grievances of patients,78 and reduces the time for resolution
of complaints from sixty to thirty days.79 Whereas Chapter 533 establishes the
IMRS, Chapter 542 provides the teeth . Chapter 525 effectuates a complete
reorganization of the regulation of health care in California. It establishes that, as
of March 1, 2000, a new regulator, the DMC, will be created, and that complete
responsibility for the regulation of managed care must be transferred to the new
body by July 1, 2000.8'
A. Chapter 536
California's Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999 is
possibly the most controversial law that the Legislature enacted during the 1999
legislative session.82 The new law declares that MCOs are engaged in the business
of insurance.83 More importantly, the new law attempts to make certain that MCOs
be subject to the duty of ordinary care, and that they be held liable for any and all
harm caused by the provision or denial of any health care service rendered on or
73. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1006, sec. 1, at 3471-72 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.5).
74. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing some of the popular goals of managed care
reform).
75. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 536, sec. 1, at 3043.
76. CAL. Ctv. CODE § 3428(a) (enacted by Chapter 536).
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1374.30-1374.35 (enacted by Chapter 533).
78. IL § 1368(a) (amended by Chapter 542).
79. L
80. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 542, at 3061.
81. CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE § 1618.5(a) (amended by Chapter 525).
82. See Bill Ainsworth, Lawmakers Ready to Send Sweeping Health-Care Reform Bills to Governor, SA
DiEG UNIO,-TUB., Sept. 10, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 4087698 (reporting that Chapter 536 had been
the subject of fierce debate between plaintiffs' attorneys and managed care plans).
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (enacted by Chapter 536).
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after January 1,2001.84 Chapter 536 also prohibits any plan from seeking indemnity
from a provider for any acts of negligence.8 The doors to the courthouse are not
completely thrown wide for the MCO plaintiff, however; the new law requires that
the treatment denied have been "medically necessary." Additionally, a plaintiff
must have exhausted the procedures provided by the MCO's grievance process and
the ]MRS, and the patient must have suffered "substantial harm. 86
B. Chapter 533
In hopes of making dispute resolution procedures more patient-friendly,87
Chapter 533 directs that after January 1, 2001, all MCO enrollees shall have the
opportunity to seek an independent medical review of a denial of health care
services based on the MCO's determination that the treatment is not "medically
necessary., 88 The enrollee cannot take advantage of the IMRS until she has
exhausted all of the MCO's internal grievance systems in compliance with the
Chapter 542 requirements, nor shall an RMRS review a coverage decision made by
an MCO.89 A coverage decision is a determination by the plan as to which specific
services it will provide.90
Chapter 533 provides that the EMRS shall be organized and regulated by the
new DMC that is established by Chapter 525.91 The DMC shall arrange for the
creation of independent medical review organizations, and the DMC will establish
qualifications for members of the medical community serving the review
organizations. 2
The new IMRS is free for enrollees, but MCOs will share the burden of
financing the program as determined by the DMC.93 In addition to the requirements
for MCOs, Chapter 533 places the same requirements for an IMRS on disability
insurers in California. 94
84. Id. § 3428(a) (enacted by Chapter 536).
85. Id. § 3428(d) (enacted by Chapter 536).
86. id. § 3428(k)(1) (enacted by Chapter 536).
87. See SENATE RULES COMMrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 55, at 4 (Sept. 9, 1999) (arguing that the
IMRS will help patients before their conditions worsen).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
89. lit § 1374.30(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 533).
90. Id. § 1374.30(c) (enacted by Chapter 533).
91. Id. § 1374.30(a) (enacted by Chapter 533).
92. Id. § 1374.30(e) (enacted by Chapter 533).
93. ld. § 1347.35(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
94. CAL INS. CODE § 10169(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
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C. Chapter 542
Chapter 542 was created to work in conjunction with Chapters 536 and 525.'s
The new law requires the DMC to contract with one or more impartial, independent,
and external entities for the purpose of reviewing grievances submitted by MCO
enrollees. 96 The new law specifies how grievances or complaints are to be
registered, and requires a patient to have participated in the MCO's grievance
process for at least 30 days before the DMC will refer the complaint to the
independent reviewer.97
Under Chapter 542, MCOs must provide enrollees with written responses to
their grievances, including a statement of the reasons for the denial of or delay in
treatment. 9' Additionally, if the plan's determination is based on a coverage
decision, the MCO is required to specify the provisions of the contract under which
it made its coverage decision."
Chapter 542 seeks to accelerate the grievance process through the DMC as well,
by requiring the DMC to make a determination within thirty days. However, it
allows for an exception if the DMC commissioner determines that additional time
is reasonably necessary to fully and fairly evaluate the grievance.' ° If, after review
of the enrollee's grievance, the DMC concludes that a denied, delayed, or modified
health care service should be provided or that the enrollee should be compensated,
and that the service was medically necessary, the department may do one of two
things.'0' First, the DMC can order the MCO to promptly offer and provide health
care services to the enrollee, or second, the DMC can order the plan to compensate
the enrollee for any reasonable costs associated with urgent care or other
compelling health care services.0 2
The DMC commissioner is empowered by Chapter 542 to investigate MCOs
and take enforcement action against plans not in compliance with the requirements
of the new law. 03 The commissioner may assess administrative penalties if he or
she determines that an MCO has knowingly committed the violation, or performed
with a frequency that indicates a general business practice.'04 Repeated failure to
act promptly and reasonably in the investigation and resolution of grievances in
accordance with the law, or repeated failure to act promptly when the obligation of
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(g) (enacted by Chapter 533).
96. Id. § 1368(g) (enacted by Chapter 542).
97. l. § 1368(c) (enacted by Chapter 542).
98. Id. § 1368(b)(4) (enacted by Chapter 542).
99. Id. § 1368(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 542).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1363(b)(6) (enacted by Chapter 542).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1368.04(b) (amended by Chapter 542).
104. Id.
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the plan to the enrollee or subscriber is reasonably clear, may also result in
penalties.105
Chapter 542 provides both patients and MCOs guidelines in the case of
experimental or investigational therapies.1'6 In keeping with the tenor of the new
reforms, an MCO must provide an independent external review of coverage
decisions when patients meet certain requirements.O7 An enrollee is eligible for an
independent external review if: (1) the enrollee has a life-threatening t 38 or seriously
debilitating condition; t°9 (2) the enrollee's physician has certified the existence of
the condition for which standard therapies have proven ineffective or are medically
inappropriate; and (3) the plan does not cover a more beneficial standard
treatment.tt0
To qualify for the experimental review, the enrollee's physician must either be
employed by the plan and have recommended the treatment, or be at least board-
eligible to practice in the area appropriate for the enrollee's treatment.'
Additionally, if the physician recommending the experimental treatment is outside
the plan, she must certify her recommendation in writing and provide two
documents of medical and scientific evidence showing that the treatment is likely
to be more beneficial than any available standard therapy.12 The patient must have
105. Id.
106. Id. § 1370.4(a) (amended by Chapter 542).
107. Id.
108. See id. § 1370.4(a)(1)(B) (amended by Chapter 542) (defining life-threatening as: "(1) diseases or
conditions wherein the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted; or (2) diseases
or conditions with potentially fatal outcomes such that the goal of clinical intervention is survival").
109. See id. § 1370.4(a)(1)(C) (amended by Chapter 542) (defining "seriously debilitating" as "diseases or
conditions that cause major irreversible morbidity.
110. Id. § 1370.4(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 542).
111. Id. § 1370.4(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 542).
112. Id. § 1370.4(d) (amended by Chapter 542); see id. (stating that "medical and scientific evidence"
means:
(1) Peer-reviewed scientific studies published in or accepted for publication by medical journals that
meet nationally recognized requirements for scientific manuscripts and that submit most of their
published articles for review by experts who are not part of the editorial staff.
(2) Peer-reviewed literature, biomedical compendia, and other medical literature that meet the
criteria of the National Institutes of Health's National Library of Medicine for indexing in Index
Medicus, Excerpta Medicus (EMBASE), Medline, and MEDLARS data base Health Services
Technology Assessment Research (HSTAR).
(3) Medical Journals recognized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, under Section 1861
(t) (2) of the Social Security Act.
(4) The following standard reference comendia: The American Hospital Formulary Service-Drug
Information, the American Medical Association Drug Evaluation, the American Dental
Association Accepted Dental Therapeutics, and the United States Pharmacopoeia-Drug
Information.
(5) Findings, studies, or research conducted by or under the auspices of federal government agencies
and nationally recognized federal research institutes, including the Federal Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute, National
Academy of Sciences, Health Care Financing Administration, Congressional Office of
Technological Assessment, and any national board recognized by the National Institutes of
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been denied the treatment by the plan, and, finally, the new law applies to situations
in which the treatment would have been covered but for the plan's determination
that the therapy is experimental or investigational.1 3 A plan's violation of the
experimental treatment grievance law is subject to the same administrative penalties
as is a violation of the external grievance process prescribed by Chapter 542, with
one exception: Chapter 542 specifically provides that MCOs may be liable for
administrative penalties of up to $5,000 per day for each day that the independent
review's decision regarding experimental treatment is not implemented."
4
D. Chapter 525
Chapter 525 declares that "it is in the public interest that the administration and
enforcement of the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, as amended,
be undertaken by a department of state government devoted exclusively to the
licensing and regulation of managed health care."' 15 In achieving this goal, Chapter
525 moves the regulation of health plans from the State Department of Corporations
in the State Business Transportation and Housing Agency to the new DMC. tt6 The
mission of the new DMC is to ensure that health plans provide enrollees with access
to quality health care services. 7 The new DMC will be headed by a director, who
will be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the State Senate. 8 In order
to provide assistance to patients who have complaints pending against their MCOs,
Chapter 525 establishes the Office of Patient Advocate." 9 Like the director, the
patient advocate will be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the State
Senate.'20 The patient advocate is charged with developing for consumers
educational guides for consumers on health care, and must make other public
outreach efforts.' 2 ' Additionally, the patient advocate's office will make
recommendations to the DMC on enforcement actions and will issue an annual
"HMO quality of care report card" to be published on the DMC World Wide Web
site.' As the process of developing the new DMC gets underway, the new
regulator shall report to the Governor and Legislature regarding the need to expand
jurisdiction of the Department to cover independent physician groups or other
Health for the purpose of evaluating the medical value of health services.
(6) Peer-reviewed abstracts accepted for presentation at major medical association meetings.).
113. Id. § 1370.4(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 542).
114. Ia § 1374.34(b) (amended by Chapter 542).
115. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1618.5(a) (amended by Chapter 525).
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1341.9 (enacted by Chapter 525).
117. Id § 1342(a) (amended by Chapter 525).
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1322 (amended by Chapter 525).
119. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1368.02(c) (amended by Chapter 525).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. §1368.02(b) (amended by Chapter 525); see id. (establishing www.dmc.ca.gov as the website
address).
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practice associations bearing significant financial risk in contracting to provide
health care services for capped or otherwise low fees.'23
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAWS
A. Tort Liability: Chapter 536
Despite some perceptions to the contrary, simply because California passes a
law providing an affirmative right to sue an MCO does not mean that the ultimate
viability of any tort suit against an MCO is settled.24 One reason for this is the
preemptive nature of federal law in general and the unsettled applicability of
ERISA to suits against MCOs. Another is the latent uncertainty of any lawsuit,
especially in terms of the uncertain nature of malpractice suits and tort suits.'25 Still
another is the slippery language that the new law features.'26
1. ERISA Preemption
One goal of managed care reform has been the development of a reliable cause
of action not subject to the broad ERISA preemption.' 27 With regard to both
complete and conflict preemption'2 in drafting Chapter 536, the Legislature
seemingly sought to decrease the chances that a court will apply the preemption
doctrine wherever possible.
When a federal court is presented with an ERISA preemption issue, an initial
determination may focus on the nature of the MCO plan itself. That is, is the plan
at issue governed by ERISA? Though the Supreme Court has not reached that
precise issue, the Ninth Circuit holds that the determination of whether an employee
benefit plan is an ERISA plan is a question of fact to be answered in light of all the
surrounding facts and circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable
person.'29 The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that an employer's purchase of group
insurance on behalf of its employees "shall only escape ERISA preemption if the
employer does not contribute any portion of the premium for the employees."'
30
123. CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1342.3 (enacted by Chapter 525).
124. See Stoeckl, supra note 32, at 407 (emphasizing that a similar law in Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590i (West 1999), had a minor immediate impact on such suits).
125. See O'Connell & Neale, supra note 9, at 294 (arguing that research suggests that few victims of
malpractice are successful in court, while the majority of suits filed have no basis in medical fact).
126. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (introducing the phrase "benefits due under the plan"); infra
note 173 (analyzing the implications of the'"medically necessary" requirement in the new law); infra notes 178-80
(analyzing a "substantial harm" requirement).
127. Id
128. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that two types of ERISA preemption exist:
complete preemption and conflict preemption).
129. Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489,482 (9th Cir. 1988).
130. Crull v. GEM Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995).
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In crafting Chapter 536 and attempting to skirt ERISA preemption, California
legislators apparently took their lead from the United States Supreme Court by
declaring that all MCOs are engaged in the business of insurance. A major case
framing the preemption issues is Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Travelers
Insurance Company.13 1 In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court was asked to
determine the validity of state-mandated minimum health care benefits to be
included in insurance policies. 32 The Court reaffirmed the broad preemptive power
of ERISA to regulate benefit plans. 33 However, the Court held that the "ERISA
savings clause" limited the preemption by excluding the state's regulation of the
business of insurance." The Court first looked at whether the state law in question
"relate[d]" to benefit plans governed by ERISA. 35 Having decided that the
Massachusetts law clearly did, the Court next determined whether the law fell under
the exception in the ERISA "savings clause.' 36 The Court took what it called a
"common-sense view of the matter," 37 and held that because this was a law
regulating insurance, Congress had not intended ERISA preemption in this case. In
1992, the Supreme Court decided another ERISA preemption case in District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade. 38 In an 8-1 opinion written by
Justice Thomas, the Court held that a law which required employers who provide
health insurance to their employees to provide equivalent coverage for injured
employees eligible for workers' compensation was preempted by ERISA."3' The
Court rejected the District of Columbia's argument and held that the District's act
involved the regulation of insurance, and therefore was not preempted. Writing for
the Court, Justice Thomas suggested that either a state law relates to an ERISA
covered plan, or it regulates the business of insurance, and that the state could
regulate both simultaneously.Y° This decision may be seen as the Court's effort to
limit Metropolitan Life, and thereby narrow the scope of the ERISA savings clause.
More recently, the "common sense" test reemerged in the ERISA saga to help
define when a state law regulates insurance and when it may be preempted. In
UNUM Life Insurance v. Ward,4' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a claim to recover disability benefits under an ERISA plan was
131. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
132. Id. at 727.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 724, 746 (1985). See generally Stoeckl, supra note 27, at 396-97 (characterizing the holding of
the Court having limited the preemption doctrine in this context).
135. Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 739.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 740-41.
138. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 132-33 (holding that mandating the creation of a welfare plan which relates to a ERISA plan
"is the end of the matter. We cannot graft a two-step analysis onto a one-step statute.").
141. 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999).
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preempted. 142 The narrower issue in the case concerned California's notice-
prejudice rule.143 That rule states that before an insurer can avoid liability, it must
show that it was prejudiced by an untimely proof of claim.144 In upholding the
decision of the Ninth Circuit, Justice Ginsberg, speaking for the Court, defined the
test used to make a regulation-of-insurance determination. 45 First, the Court will
ask, from a common sense perspective, whether the state law in question regulates
the insurance industry.14 Next, the Court will consider the three factors employed
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 47 which defines the parameters for the business of
insurance. 48 Those factors are: (1) whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policy holder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3)
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. 49 After
weighing the factors in light of the notice-prejudice rule, the Court held that the
California law had not been preempted.
50
The holding and analysis of Ward and Metropolitan Life obviously give hope
to advocates of managed care reform, as evidenced by the drafting of Chapter
536.'15 However, a court may find distinctions between Chapter 536 and the laws
contested in the recent case law. Namely, the nature of the law contested in Ward
and Metropolitan Life and Chapter 536 may be seen as inapposite. In its application,
the challenged notice-prejudice rule under Ward is much more narrow than Chapter
536. Also, Chapter 536 singles out MCOs, a result that may be seen as an
impermissible distinction since the notice-prejudice law in Ward applies to all
insurers and the sweeping regulation of insurance in Metropolitan Life. Finally, the
laws may be seen as fundamentally distinguishable in terms of purpose. In
Metropolitan Life, the law in dispute sought to regulate the content of health
insurance plans in general. 52 The statute basically changed the requirements for
those engaged in the business of insurance in Massachusetts, and applied those new
142. Id. at 1384.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1386.
146. Id.
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (West 1997).
148. Id.
149. frd, 119 S.Ct. at 1386 (1999).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMTFrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 21, at 9-10 (June 29,
1999) (matching language from Ward permitting the regulation of insurance and stating that Chapter 536 would
impose liability on health plans, even if the Court were to find laws making health plans liable for medical
malpractice to otherwise be preempted).
152. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,727 (1985) (holding that the statute in
question requires that specified minimum mental health care benefits be provided to any state resident who is
insured under a general insurance policy, an accident or sickness insurance policy, or an employee health care
policy).
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rules to all insurance companies." 5 While an argument can be made that imposing
a new standard of care and accompanying liability on the managed care industry
likewise changes the requirements for doing business in California, a difference
does exist. The managed care industry operates and spreads risk on several levels
and has engulfed nearly the entire health care industry.1-4 Therefore, California's
Chapter 536 changes the business of doctors' groups, hospitals, urgent care centers,
chiropractors and nursing homes, as well as the managed care organizations which
provide the utilization reviews and the insurance company like HMOs, but leave
traditional insurers untouched. In that regard, a court may not see Chapter 536 as
being akin to the type of mandatory benefits law upheld in Metropolitan Life.!5
Notwithstanding the disparity, some commentators have embraced this distinction
and have even suggested that MCOs, as opposed to indemnity health insurers,
should bear sole responsibility for patient care under a theory of enterprise
liability.
156
The fundamental nature of Chapter 536 may be too dissimilar to be upheld
under r,ard or Metropolitan Life. The ERISA statute is silent as to the content of
the terms required of a given health or insurance plan-which has led legislatures
to widely regulate such terms-but it is not silent on civil enforcement.
157
Therefore, because Chapter 536 is attempting to supplant the ERISA remedy of
contractual damages with state tort law claims, Chapter 536 seems readily
distinguishable from the laws upheld in Ward and Metropolitan Life.
Common law issues notwithstanding, another potential issue with regard to
ERISA preemption is written into Chapter 536. Analysis of this issue requires the
theoretical distinction between the sufficiency of health care provided in a given
instance from the appropriateness, skill, or quality with which that care has been
provided; a quantity versus quality distinction. Though ERISA does not recognize
the distinction,' 5 the fact that MCOs often bifurcate the functions of utilization
review (quantity) and the provision of that care (quality) helps.159 While one
department, or even a separate contracting entity, conducts a utilization review to
determine which care to provide, another department or entity one step down the
ladder "arranges for" and provides the care as determined by the utilization review
153. See id. at 731 (recognizing that the purpose of the law was to correct the insurance market).
154. ROSENBLATET AL, supra note 7, at 551.
155. Id.
156. See generally, Havighurst supra note 6, at 589 (suggesting that it would be in the plans' long term
interest to accept liability).
157. Metropolitan 471 U.S. at 736 (quoting the superior court as stating that, "[s]ince nothing in ERISA
regulates the content of welfare plans, state regulation of insurance that indirectly affects the content of welfare
plans is not pre-empted by ERISA").
158. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that text of ERISA does.
support to an argument that claims regarding the quality of benefits due, are clams under the ERISA complete
preemption portion of the law).
159. See ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 7, at 551-62 (discussing the various struc ures of managed care
entities including vertically integrated risk sharing mechanisms).
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entity.160 This quantity/quality distinction was seized upon by the Third Circuit. The
Third Circuit ruled in Dukes that a plaintiff could state a claim for a defect in the
quality or arrangement of care, while a claim for the quantity would be
preempted. 161
This quality/quantity distinction is important in the context of the new law
because Chapter 536 includes a qualifying clause which says that the MCO shall
have a duty of ordinary care in the provision of "medically necessary health care
service[s], where the health care service is a benefit provided under the plan."'62
That clause begs the question: what if the care is not a benefit provided under the
plan? This language is remarkably similar to the language in the "complete
preemption" portion of ERISA, which supersedes state law claims for "benefits due
under the plan.' 63 The language is also that which the Dukes court skirted by
deciding that a plaintiff could state a case irrespective of ERISA preemption.' 64 The
plaintiff in that case accomplished this goal by alleging a defect in the quality of
care as opposed to a defect in determination of what kind of care was provided for
"under the plan."' 65
Therefore, by seeming to cast the "benefits under the plan" language of ERISA
as a qualifying clause, the Legislature, whether intentionally or not, may be
gambling that the Dukes rationale will win. If this assumption does not prove
erroneous, and a claim for vicarious liability or other common law torts going to the
quality of care is not provided under the plan, a plaintiff might face a paradox; if
she wishes to invoke Chapter 536's standard of care and accompanying remedies,
she must concede that her claims concern health care benefits under the plan,
whether already provided or not, instead of asserting that the claims go to the
quality of the care received, as described and allowed in the Dukes case. 66 This
dilemma exists because the plaintiff will seek to avoid removal and preemption in
the first instance by characterizing her claims as not relating to benefits provided
under the plan, and because the standard of care afforded by Chapter 536 may only
apply to benefits provided under the plan. 67 If the Dukes rationale prevails in the
ERISA context, this dilemma will not present a problem for plaintiffs because the
Dukes rationale allows claims for benefits due under the plan to include claims for
160. Id.
161. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358-60 (phrasing the distinction in terms of quantity/quality distinction). But see
Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the quality construction in the context
of a vicarious liability claim against an MCO).
162. CAL CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (enacted by Chapter 536) (emphasis added).
163. 29 U.S.C.A §1132 (West 1997).
164. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 351-52 (ducking the issues concerning the clause's language).
165. l
166. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (describing the Dukes reasoning).
167. See CAL CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (enacted by Chapter 536) (stating that the standard of care shall apply
where the health care service is a benefit provided under the plan).
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the provision of poor quality of care.' 6 More likely is the notion that a court will
read the benefits under the plan language as simply trying to restrict Chapter 536's
application to medical services that a subscriber receives pursuant to her policy.
Howevei, a contrary outcome is possible, especially if the court is inclined to
uphold preemption.
The common law history of MCO suits and ERISA preemption is illustrative
of the complexities and ambiguities that accompany an ERISA preemption analysis.
Whether the California Legislature's drafting will have a salutary effect on
plaintiffs is yet to be determined. Clear guidelines from the Supreme Court or from
the U.S. Congress may be required before the issue can be settled. The Supreme
Court has agreed to decide a case of ERISA preemption in the context of a
plaintiff's claim that an MCO's use of risk-spreading capitation schemes violates
the fiduciary duty required by ERISA 69 In Herdrich v. Pegram,"70 the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the beneficiary had stated an actionable claim."' In reviewing
Herdrich, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to put to rest several of the issues
with which the courts of appeals have struggled in regard to ERISA preemption, as
well as to determine the fate of the California legislation discussed herein and
similar efforts nationwide. Just down the street from the High Court, other battles
are being waged, as federal legislation similar to California's new laws is detained
in conference committee hearings at the U.S. Capitol." 2 If the "right to sue" is
included in the new federal law, an argument that Congress intends to preclude state
law claims against MCOs with ERISA will be difficult indeed.
2. Remaining State Court Questions
Suppose that the Supreme Court or Congress has discounted ERISA preemption
with regard to MCOs. If that is the case, then Chapter 536 becomes a severe limit
on a plaintiffs right to recover for an injury and a boon for the MCO industry,
rather than the patients' reform measure it was originally designed to be. The
industry and the State Legislature may have forseen the fall of ERISA preemption,
either at the hands of the High Court or the U.S. Congress, and therefore allowed
for a law in California permitting the filing of suits, provided that only the most
restrictive such law would be enacted. Absent ERISA preemption for MCOs or the
168. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (holding thataclaim as to the quality of a benefit is not a claim for purposes
of ERISA).
169. Infra notes 170-72.
170. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998) cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999).
171. Id, at 380.
172. See Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Erpand Rights on Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at
ABS 1, available in 1999 WL 29280487 (reporting on the passage of a bill giving patients a wide range of rights,
including the right to sue health insurance plans).
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new California legislation embodied in Chapter 536, California MCOs would be
subject to the standards of legal liability applicable in an ordinary tort suit.
Chapter 536 has two important limitations to recovery, one of which raises the
bar far and above the usual preponderance of the evidence standard needed in a
malpractice case. The first is the "medically necessary" requirement, and the second
is the "substantial harm" limitation. The new law says that the MCO "shall have a
duty of ordinary care to arrange for the provision of medically necessary health care
services to subscribers and enrollees.' 7 3 First, the question arises as to the meaning
of "medically necessary." Beyond supplying only the care a patient needs, the
medically necessary analysis is a method of limiting the services to a subscriber,
thereby limiting the financial risk that an MCO will face.174 The medical necessity
exclusion is usually applied by an MCO to a particular patient in a particular
circumstance on the basis of protocols or generalizations about the care needed for
other patients in similar circumstances. 175 In the context of a court decision, an
MCO's definition of medically necessary must be consistent with that of the
pertinent medical community, much like in a traditional malpractice suit.176 In a
given MCO malpractice suit, the medically necessary issue will arise only when a
type of care has been denied, because if it were provided, even in a negligent
manner, the MCO a fortiori deemed it medically necessary. In those situations
wherein the MCO denied the treatment, the plaintiff may attempt to show that the
MCO has been negligent in determining that the decision was not medically
necessary, and therefore that the care sought was in fact medically necessary, in
order to satisfy the qualification in Chapter 536.'77
The next hurdle Chapter 536 adds to a patient's potential recovery against an
MCO is its "substantial harm" requirement. 78 This is a factual hurdle, and Chapter
536 states that, for the purposes of the law, "substantial harm" means that the
patient must suffer "loss of life, loss or significant impairment of limb or bodily
function, significant disfigurement, severe and chronic physical pain, or significant
financial loss.' ' 17 9 Therefore, if an MCO negligently denies medically necessary
treatment to a patient which results in moderate financial loss, some disfigurement
and chronic, yet not severe, pain, the patient will not recover at all. As with other
173. CAL CIv. CODE § 3428(a) (enacted by Chapter 536).
174. ROSENBLATr ET AL, supra note 7, at 212.
175. Id.; see also Dina M. Assad, Comment, Medical Necessity: The Cure for WhatAils, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
465, 470-72 (1993) (explaining how the limitation on treatment that is not "medically necessary" became a
convenient medium through which MCOs could avoid paying for certain types of care).
176. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 846, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (1989) (holding that
the insurer may not employ a standard of medical necessity at variance with the community standard).
177. See Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 846, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58 (discussing the fact that there was
evidence that the denial of the plaintiff's claim was not simply the result of poor judgment, but also of incomplete
medical records).
178. CAL CIw. CODE § 3428(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 536).
179. Id.
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torts, the amount of recovery is that amount which will compensate the plaintiff for
all damages proximately caused by the MCO.8 °
B. Dispute Resolution
By enacting Chapter 533 and Chapter 542, California legislators have taken a
bifurcated approach to improving the dispute resolution process with regacd to
MCOs. Chapter 533 establishes the independent medical review system, which has
been heralded as the centerpiece of the managed care reforms."' Chapter 542 places
new requirements on health plans' internal and external grievance systems and
seeks to make certain that decisions made by the IMRS are followed by the
MCOs.18 2 Chapter 525, though not directly tied to Chapters 533 and 542, establishes
the new regulatory scheme under which California's new managed care system will
operate.
1. Chapter 533
Chapter 533 does not guarantee to all MCO enrollees that the [MRS will hear
their claims. 18 3 Rather, the IMRS will grant them the "opportunity" for such a
hearing.' 4 The MCO patient may apply to the DMC when: (1) her doctor, who may
or may not be a plan doctor, has recommended a health care service as medically
necessary; (2) the enrollee has received urgent care a doctor deemed medically
necessary; or (3) the enrollee has at least been seen by an in-plan doctor for the
diagnosis or treatment for which the enrollee seeks review.' 85 The in-plan doctor
does not need to recommend the treatment as medically necessary as a condition of
review; however, the plan will not be liable for services provided by an out-of-plan
doctor except in an emergency or as otherwise provided by the plan.'86
Before the patient is eligible for the IMRS, the medical service request must be
"disputed."' 7 For the purposes of Chapter 533, "disputed" means that a health care
service which is eligible for coverage under the patient's contract has been denied,
modified, or delayed by a decision of the MCO or one of its doctors at least in part
180. Id. § 3428(b) (enacted by Chapter 536).
181. See, e.g., Sharon Bernstein, Proposal Has No Cure for Physician Groups Regulation: Davis' Plan
Would Provide New Protections for Patients but Offer Little on Providers' Financial Crisis, L.A. TiMES, Aug.
21, 1999, at Cl, available in 1999 WL 2188530 (stating that the most significant provision is the Governor's
proposal to establish State-run panels to which consumers who have been denied treatment can appeal).
182. See generaIlySENAT FLooR, ANALYSiS oFSB 189 at 1 (Sept. 10, 1999) (describing the enforcement
provisions of Chapter 542).
183. CA_ HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 533).
184. Id. § 1374.30(e) (enacted by Chapter 533).
185. Id. § 1374.30(j)(1)(A)-(C) (enacted by Chapter 533).
186. Id. § 1374.30(j)(1)(C) (enacted by Chapter 533).
187. Id. § 1374.30(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
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because the service was not "medically necessary."' 8 Once the treatment sought is
"disputed," the patient must also have filed a grievance with the MCO's internal
process and have been denied treatment by the grievance process, or the grievance
have languished in that process for thirty days.8 9 The time limit is shortened to
three days in the case of emergencies. 19°
If a patient believes she has met the requirements for the IMRS, she may
petition the DMC for a review.' 9' Chapter 533 does not specify how long the DMC
may take to make a determination as to whether it will permit an IMRS review; it
only states that the "department shall expeditiously review requests."'192 If the DMC
denies the enrollee's request for review, the case is automatically treated as a
grievance pursuant to the new grievance provisions of Chapter 542.'9'
Chapter 533 directs that the DMC shall refer only decisions regarding medical
necessity to the IMRS, and coverage decisions are specifically not to be referred."9
The new law defines a "coverage decision" as an "approval or denial of health care
services by a plan, or by one of its contracting entities, substantially based on a
finding that the provisions of the particular service is included or excluded as a
covered benefit under the terms and conditions of the.., plan contract."'95 Chapter
533 also states that the DMC will be the final arbiter as to whether a grievance is
a disputed health care service or a coverage decision. 196 Examples of treatments not
generally covered under some plans are "experimental" treatments, pre-existing
conditions, dental or mental health, or even some causes of injury, such as
automobile accidents. 197 What constitutes a valid coverage decision on the part of
an MCO has been heavily litigated, so an MCO's labeling of a denial of treatment
as a "coverage decision" which results in a patient not being allowed to use the
IMRS may also be fodder for litigation.' 98 When a court reviews a coverage
decision, it must do so under a de novo review unless the plan administrator has
discretion in deciding such decisions, and in that case a narrow "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review applies.' 99
Once the DMS has granted an IMRS review, the new law directs the reviewer
to complete the review "to the maximum extent practicable, within 30 days of the
188. Id.
189. Id. § 1374.30(j)(3) (enacted by Chapter 533).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 1374.30(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 533).
192. Id. § 1374.3 1(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 1374.30(c) (enacted by Chapter 533).
195. Id
196. Id. § 1374.30(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 533).
197. ROSENSBLATr ET AL, supra note 7, at 139.
198. Cf. e.g., Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661, 663 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that high-
dose chemotherapy with a bone marrow transplant was not experimental and therefore was covered under the
plan).
199. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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receipt of the application for review and supporting documentation. ' '2tu In
evaluating the application, the reviewer is to "determine whether the disputed health
care service was medically necessary based on the specific medical needs of the
enrollee and any of the following:
(1) Peer-reviewed scientific and medical evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the disputed service.
(2) Nationally recognized professional standards.
(3) Expert opinion.
(4) Generally accepted standards of medical practice.
(5) Treatments that are likely to provide a benefit to a patient for
conditions for which other treatments are not clinically efficacious.201
If at least half of the medical professionals reviewing the case determine that the
disputed health care service is medically necessary, the service will be provided, or
if the patient has already had the service, she will be compensated as if it had been
medically necessary.2
2. Chapter 542
At first blush, Chapter 542 seems to improve the patient's ability to achieve
prompt and equitable resolution.203 Whereas plans used to be allowed to take up to
sixty days to complete their internal grievance decisions, Chapter 542 reduces the
time for interview review to thirty days.204
When MCOs make their determinations according to the grievance processes,
they must include specific clinical reasons if they find a given treatment not to be
medically necessary.205 This provision purports to be beneficial to both plans and
patients in that a more precise determination will assist a patient in attacking the
MCO's reasoning, and assist the MCO by permitting its incorrect treatment denial
to be overturned by a medical review prior to being sued.216 The new law removes
the cap and imposes further administrative penalties against plans that fail to
implement decisions of the IMRS. 207
200. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33(c) (enacted by Chapter 533).
201. Id. § 1374.33(b) (enacted by Chapter 533).
202. Id. § 1374.33(d) (enacted by Chapter 533).
203. See SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSiS of SB 139, at 3 (Sept. 7, 1999) (arguing that under
Chapter 542, the public would have the opportunity to obtain needed treatment in a timely manner).
204. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(1)(A) (enacted by Chapter 542).
205. Id at § 1368(a) (enacted by Chapter 542).
206. SENATE RULES COMMrITEE, FLOOR ANALYSiS OFSB 189, at3 (Sept. 7, 1999).
207. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1368(b)(4), 1368.04(a) (enacted by Chapter 542).
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3. Chapter 525
The move of regulation of MCOs by the Department of Corporations (DOC)
to a new department had been pushed even by MCO representatives. : °8 Because
Governor Davis agreed, and promised to remove MCO regulation from the DOC,2° 9
the Legislature was practically guaranteed to make the change. The long-term
effects of the new regulator remain to be seen, but with a regulating body chartered
with a mandate to ensure that health plans provide enrollees with access to quality




During the summer of 1999, if someone were to mention the "phantom
menace" in the halls of the California Capitol, a passerby would have been just as
likely to have taken the reference as one directed at an FMO rather than the new
Star Wars film.2 11 While little doubt exists that patient-friendly dispute resolution
coupled with the ability to sue an MCO will have a salutary effect on an enrollee's
claims, what is less clear are the long-term implications for the cost of health
insurance to all Californians.
The debate about how best to provide for society's health care needs has raged
for decades, 22 and will continue to do so. While Chapters 525, 533, 536, and 542
address the surface issues, the rest of the iceberg seems to go unnoticed by many.
213
The issue is risk-spreading, and with risk-spreading, the question is: by whom
should the risk primarily be borne?214 Currently, MCOs usually bear the risk of high
individual patient costs outpacing premiums. In MCOs's effort to reduce that risk,
their sometimes poor decisions have led to the horror stories that punctuate the
208. See Ben Sullivan, HMO Reforms Urged; Lobbying Group Seeks to Defeat Managed Care Bills
Proposed, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 30, 1999, at BI (reporting that a representative of the California Association
of Health Plans representative has backed the creation of a DMC).
209. See Dennis Love, State HMO Reform Prepares to Enterthe Spotlight, SACRAMENTo BEE, May 3,1999,
at A1, available in 1999 WL 4439018 (reporting that "[t]he only promise Governor Davis has made to date is that
state authority over HMOs will be taken away from the Department of Corporations, where it has resided since
1975").
210. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.2 (amended by Chapter 525).
211. See Love, supra note 209, at A7 (describing 1-MO horror stories in which patients were "at the mercy
of the supposedly ruthless, profit-lusting managed-care industry," and explaining that such stories have prompted
the public demand for reform).
212. See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp. 477,481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating
that "[tihe need to make "rational" health care policy has been the obsession of this country for decades").
213. See The Patients' Rights Train, WALL ST. J., Sept 29, 1999, at A22 (arguing that "[l]ost in the
[managed care] developments is any recognition that the real problem here is the nature of coverage itself").
214. See BERKMAN, supra note 8, at 16-17 (stating that the risk spreading inherent in managed care is
needed to facilitate the predictability of costs for employers).
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headlines.1 5 In response, some larger MCOs have pushed a portion of the risk
downstream to physician groups.2 t6 Physician groups are typically without the
benefit of actuarial training or the economies of scale enjoyed by larger MCOs, so
this move has also inspired headlines as well as bankruptcies;217 thus, discerning
critics believe in the argument that the nature of the risk-spreading business applied
in the context of increasing patient demands has caused the problems of managed
care, as opposed to believing in the easy and conclusory corporate greed notion.1 8
The new California reforms are geared toward a trade-off between the need for
slowing the rate of the cost of health care and the need for quality and
accountability. 19 This larger question has not-nor could it probably have-been
sufficiently answered by the passage of Chapters 525, 533,536, and 542. However,
the answer to whether California's and America's health care system "will be
driven in the future primarily by the cost-conscious choices of consumers and their
agents or by regulatory mandates imposed by legislatures responding
opportunistically to popular fears and powerful interest groups" may determine the
long-term viability of the new managed care reforms." 0
215. See O'Connell & Neale, supra note 9, at 291 (pointing out that one managed care critic is corrct in
noting that managed care has created the potential for improper denial of coverage for treatment).
216. See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk & Daniel M. Weintraub, HMO Reform: Gov Davis Is VagueAboutilis Plans;
HMOs Shifting Power, Risk to Doctors, Health Care: More Rejections of Further Treatment Are Coming from
Medical Gro ups, Not Insurers, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Apr. 12, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 4294533
(suggesting that if public officials pounce on HMOs, such officials might miss their target because "more and
more, the HFlMOs &re shifting financial risk, and power, to local physicians' groups. That means the groups and
the doctors who are members of them have an even greater financial incentive to limit care for the people who
depend on them for their lives").
217. Id; see Bernstein, supra note 11 (noting that in the last three years, 115 California physicians' groups
have declared bankruptcy and an estimated 85% are in serious financial trouble).
218. See also Havighurst, supra note 6, at 590 (suggesting that
much of the evidence of quality problems in MCOs is only anecdotal, appearing it journalistic
accouns. In addition, much of the criticism is misdirected and misleading in failing to explain the
probabilistic nature of medical care or to take into account the cost side of the benefit/cost trade-offs
that pervade medical care but have only lately been taken into account-hanks in part to MCOs-in
clinical decisions).
219. Cf. Ainsworth, supra note 82, at Al (reporting that Governor Davis did not want to expand HMO
coverage requirements to such an extent as to force an increase in health care premium costs).
220. Havighurst, supra note 6, at 590.
